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ON UNCERTAINTY, AMBIGUITY, 
AND CONTRACTUAL CONDITIONS 
BY ERIC L. TALLEY* 
ABSTRACT 
This article uses the recent Delaware Chancery Court case of Hexion 
v. Huntsman as a template for motivating thoughts about how contract law 
should interpret contractual conditions in general—and "material adverse 
event" provisions in particular—within environments of extreme ambiguity 
(as opposed to risk).  Although ambiguity and aversion thereto bear some 
facial similarities to risk and risk aversion, an optimal contractual alloca-
tion of uncertainty does not always track the optimal allocation of risk.  
After establishing these intuitions as a conceptual proposition, I endeavor to 
test them empirically, using a unique data set of 528 actual material adverse 
event provisions in corporate acquisitions transactions between 2007 and 
2008.  My results are consistent with my conceptual account distinguishing 
risk from uncertainty. Although intuitive, the idea that material adverse 
event provisions can be a means for allocating uncertainty contrasts with 
the received wisdom in corporate law scholarship about the nature and 
purpose of such terms.  Using MAC/MAE provisions as an animating narra-
tive, this article concludes that the behavioral economics concept of 
ambiguity aversion is a helpful device for understanding contractual con-
ditions and excuses.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of 2007, weeks before credit markets betrayed a 
fragility that would later escalate into global crisis, two American chemical 
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corporations executed a landmark merger.  In a $10 billion leveraged acqui-
sition, Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc. (Hexion)1 agreed to purchase all 
outstanding shares of the Huntsman Corporation (Huntsman) for $28 cash 
per share, a price representing an approximate 40% premium over Hunts-
man's trading value.2  As is typical with such transactions, the written merger 
agreement contained a litany of warranties, representations, terms, and 
conditions, including a cancellation fee, due diligence obligations, and 
assorted contingencies and exclusions related to Hexion's financing, com-
pany solvency, regulatory clearance, and shareholder approval.  The con-
ditions also included a commonly-used force majeure provision known as a 
''material adverse change''/''material adverse event'' clause (sometimes known 
as a MAC/MAE), that expressly conditioned Hexion's obligation to close on 
the absence of ''any occurrence, condition, change, event or effect that is 
materially adverse to the financial condition, business, or results of 
operations of [Huntsman] taken as a whole . . . ''3  Deal in hand, the two 
companies set course on a due diligence process that—while costly, arduous, 
and time consuming—promised lucrative results.  Once closed, the Hexion-
Huntsman merger would result in the world's largest specialty chemical 
company, a fact not lost on Hexion's CEO, who ebulliently described the 
acquisition as "'a great opportunity to create a world-class company with 
leading-edge products and technologies' and a more global reach, especially 
'in the high-growth Asia-Pacific region.'"4 
 
                                                                                                             
1Hexion is in turn owned by the private equity firm Apollo Management. 
2Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 724 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
Huntsman previously had entered an acquisition agreement with Basell A.F., which Hexion topped 
by 8%.  The 40% figure reported in the text reflects the premium over Huntsman's stock price before 
it was "in play.'' 
 3Id. at 736.  In addition, the clause went on to list exceptions (or "carve outs") to the defini-
tion of an MAE: 
[I]n no event shall any of the following constitute a Company Material Adverse 
Effect: (A) any occurrence, condition, change, event or effect resulting from or 
relating to changes in general economic or financial market conditions, except in 
the event, and only to the extent, that such occurrence, condition, change, event or 
effect has had a disproportionate effect on the Company and its Subsidiaries, taken 
as a whole, as compared to other Persons engaged in the chemical industry; (B) any 
occurrence, condition, change, event or effect that affects the chemical industry 
generally (including changes in commodity prices, general market prices and 
regulatory changes affecting the chemical industry generally) except in the event, 
and only to the extent, that such occurrence, condition, change, event or effect has 
had a disproportionate effect on the Company and its Subsidiaries, taken as a 
whole, as compared to other Persons engaged in the chemical industry . . . . 
Id. at 736-37 (emphasis omitted).  Such carve outs in these sorts of terms are relatively common.  
See infra Part IV. 
 4Kevin Kingsbury & Ana Campoy, Why Apollo Was So Keen To Acquire Huntsman, WALL 
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A folk proverb from the American West teaches that timing is the 
most critical ingredient of a successful rain dance. If so, then Hexion and 
Huntsman began their proverbial dance—perhaps unwittingly—on the eve 
of an epic drought.  Within weeks of the announcement, worldwide credit 
tightened, acquisition targets lost value, and capital markets swooned, 
plunging headlong into uncertainty and pessimism.  Evidently not immune to 
the crisis, Huntsman also began releasing extremely disappointing financial 
reports; so disappointing, in fact, that Hexion's attorneys started to scour the 
deal for plausible escape hatches.  And so it came to pass that in June 2008 
—eleven months after announcing the acquisition—Hexion appeared before 
the Delaware Court of Chancery seeking declarations that (1) the combined 
company would be insolvent, thereby excusing Hexion's performance; (2) a 
material adverse event had occurred, thus again excusing Hexion's per-
formance; and (3) that in any event, Hexion's maximal exposure for breach-
ing the contract would be limited to the $325 million cancellation fee in the 
merger agreement.5 
In late September 2008, following a six day bench trial, Vice 
Chancellor Lamb issued his much anticipated ruling on Hexion's declaratory 
judgment action.6  Its eighty-nine pages delivered a stunning rebuke.  Lamb 
first rejected Hexion's assertion that the combined company would be 
insolvent, holding that Hexion had strategically doctored both companies' 
earnings projections, effectively engineering an insolvency opinion from its 
financial adviser and thereby rendering it unreliable.7  Second, he found that 
notwithstanding the language of the MAE clause—which bore the linguistic 
markers of a condition precedent to closing—he would nonetheless construe 
it as a condition subsequent.8  The effect of this finding was to place the 
burden squarely on Hexion's shoulders (rather than Huntsman's) to prove 
that a material adverse event had occurred.9  Hexion, he concluded, had not 
met this burden.10  Finally, Lamb held that because Hexion's duties were not 
excused, it had knowingly and intentionally breached numerous covenants of 
the agreement, and consequently was subject to specific performance of the 
transaction, or in the alternative, damages unbounded by the cancellation fee, 
                                                                                                             
ST. J., July 13, 2007, at A7 (quoting Craig O. Morrison, Hexion chairman and chief executive 
officer). 
 5See Hexion, 965 A.2d at 721-22 (outlining the arguments in the complaint). 
 6Id. at 720. 
 7Id. at 727-30. 
8Id. at 741-42. 
9Hexion, 965 A.2d at 739-40.  Although the MAE provision was stated in the Repre-
sentations and Warranties section of the merger agreement, compliance with the representations and 
warranties was later enumerated as one of many "Conditions Precedent" to closing.  Id. at 748 n.93. 
10Id. at 743 ("Ultimately, the burden is on Hexion to demonstrate the existence of an MAE 
in order to negate its obligation to close, and that is a burden it cannot meet here."). 
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possibly exceeding the $10 billion purchase price.11  Almost immediately, 
the ruling generated shock waves through the mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) community that reverberate to this day.12 
In some respects, the Hexion-Huntsman saga may be little more than 
an aberration.  As observers noted as far back as 2007, the deal contained a 
number of provisions that—while not unheard of individually—aggregated 
to an agreement that was peculiarly advantageous to the seller.13  These 
terms included a specific performance clause, a clause requiring Hexion to 
use best efforts to enforce financing commitments from third parties, 
relatively lax buyer-side covenants, and a "hell or high water" clause re-
quiring Hexion to take all actions necessary to make the deal pass regulatory 
muster.14  In light of these provisions, Lamb's unsentimental censure of 
Hexion was perhaps as unsurprising as it was understandable.  After all, the 
parties had entered into a contract that they knew involved risks, and yet they 
chose to proceed in an expedited fashion and on relatively seller-friendly 
terms.  To excuse Hexion's obligations now would be to violate the very risk 
allocation decisions that manifestly defined the deal.  In short, Hexion had 
concocted a noxious stew of speculation, leverage, and peril, and Vice Chan-
cellor Lamb was now merely compelling Hexion to eat its own cooking. 
But if the facts of the case were so idiosyncratic, what explains the 
tremendous attention (and apprehension) that the case attracted within the 
business law community?  Perhaps it had something to do with the dollar 
amounts at stake, the profile of the companies and law firms involved, or the 
morbid fascination that any public train wreck attracts.  Yet while the 
Hexion-Huntsman dispute had all these factors, so do many others.  It is 
more likely, I conjecture, that notwithstanding its unique attributes (indeed 
possibly because of them), the Hexion-Huntsman deal provides a benchmark 
 
                                                                                                             
11Id. at 762-63. 
12Although far from a scientific inquiry, as of mid-November 2008, there had been more 
than a quarter of a million Google searches related to the dispute between Hexion and Huntsman. 
The case also began toppling a string of high-profile litigation dominos between Hexion, 
Huntsman, and the debt capital providers for the deal, Deutsche Bank and Credit Suisse.  After the 
court of chancery ruling, both banks refused to fund the deal, citing their own MAE provisions with 
Hexion.  The banks were later sued by both Hexion (in New York) and Huntsman (in Texas) for 
their refusal to move forward.  In December 2008, Hexion and Huntsman terminated the merger, the 
terms of which required Hexion, Apollo, and the banks to pay Huntsman $1 billion in cash and 
notes.  See Peter Lattman, Apollo, Huntsman Reach Amicable Split, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2008, 
at C1. 
13See DealBook, Huntsman-Hexion: A Deal Agreement to Applaud, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/11/huntsman-hexion-a-deal-agreement-to-applaud/ 
(Jan. 11, 2008, 16:34 EST) (praising the agreement). 
14Id. 
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for the thousands of corporate and commercial transactions undertaken 
before the current financial crisis began and which are now proceeding in an 
economic environment filled with unpredictability and ambiguity.15  The 
case gives us pause precisely because it raises the possibility that any 
contract, even a corporate acquisition negotiated by sophisticated attorneys, 
may be ill equipped to deal with the wild gyrations that have characterized 
capital markets during the last year.  At its core, Hexion invites us to re-
evaluate the very nature of contracting itself and how the law does (or 
should) excuse contractual commitments within environments of extreme 
unpredictability.  The analytic domain of this question, in turn, transcends 
the narrow (though important) boundaries of MAC/MAE clauses, applying 
to numerous other contract doctrines, such as constructive conditions, 
material breach, frustration of purpose, impracticability, and mutual mistake. 
This article uses the Hexion case to motivate some preliminary 
thoughts about how contract law should interpret contractual conditions in 
general—and MAC/MAE provisions in particular—within environments of 
extreme ambiguity.  I advance the thesis that contract law and doctrine must 
be sensitive to two different sources of randomness: risk and uncertainty.  
"Risk" refers to randomness whose probabilistic nature is extremely familiar 
and can be characterized with objective probabilities (such as the outcome 
odds that attend the roll of a fair die).  "Uncertainty," in contrast, refers to 
randomness whose probabilistic behavior is extremely unfamiliar, unknown, 
or even unknowable.  Although this distinction was historically neglected in 
classical economics (and much of law and economics), it is now relatively 
common fare in behavioral economics and finance literature.16  If an 
 
                                                                                                             
15As one notable firm's client letter put it: "While the Hexion Court has not created contro-
versial precedent, the facts and circumstances of this case are nonetheless instructive to dealmakers 
and their deal counsel in drafting and negotiating merger agreement provisions, especially in the 
present environment of illiquid credit markets and extraordinary market occurrences."  Hexion v. 
Huntsman: Delaware Court Offers Interpretive Guidance on Key Terms of Disputed Merger 
Agreement, CORP. GOVERNANCE GROUP CLIENT LETTER ALERT (Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & 
McCloy LLP, New York, N.Y.), Oct. 13, 2009, at 1-2, available at http://www.milbank.com/NR/ 
rdonlyres/80BBC5CF-BAB0-4C88-8206 FEF197238729/0/Hexion _v_Huntsman.pdf. 
16The origins of the risk/uncertainty distinction trace back nearly a century to Frank Knight.  
See generally FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921). 
Although the specific distinction between risk and uncertainty I focus on here is a dominant 
one in the literature, it is not alone.  One alternative view posits the distinction to relate to future 
states that can be conceived or described ex ante (risk) and those that cannot (uncertainty).  See 
ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2006); Richard N. Langlois & Metin M. 
Cosgel, Frank Knight on Risk, Uncertainty, and the Firm: A New Interpretation, 31 ECON. 
INQUIRY 456 (1993).  Another view simply rejects the distinction between them altogether. See 
MILTON FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY (1976).  I conjecture that to some degree, the approach I take 
here might be extended to either of these alternative views (particularly the former).  See infra notes 
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individual is willing to expend resources to avoid uncertainty (as distinct 
from risk), she is said to be ambiguity averse.17 
I argue below that while ambiguity aversion bears some facial 
similarity to risk aversion, an optimal contractual allocation of uncertainty 
does not always track the optimal allocation of risk.  Consequently, if 
ambiguity-averse parties operate amidst both uncertainty and risk, they will 
prefer contract terms that are sensitive to both phenomena.  In particular, 
prospective uncertainty about the gains from trade can dampen (sometimes 
substantially) the benefit that the parties perceive ex ante from carrying out 
their transaction.  When such prospective uncertainty becomes extreme, 
moreover, an optimal contract can respond in an analogously extreme way, 
calling for complete contractual rescission (effectively reimposing autarky). 
After establishing these intuitions as a conceptual proposition, I then 
endeavor to test them empirically, using a unique data set of 528 actual 
MAC/MAE provisions in corporate acquisitions transactions between 2007 
and 2008.  Using this data, I devise a simple set of "scores" meant to capture 
the breadth of MAC/MAE provisions within each deal.  Consistent with an 
ambiguity aversion account, I find MAC/MAE breadth to be consistently 
responsive to indicators of market uncertainty prevailing at the time of 
negotiation: as market uncertainty grows (controlling for other variables, 
including those conventionally associated with risk), the ensuing MAC/MAE 
provisions tend to become increasingly expansive.18  The positive relation-
ship between MAC/MAE breadth and market uncertainty, moreover, appears 
robust across industries, as well as all combinations of public and private 
acquirers and targets. In contrast, conventional measures of risk used in 
corporate finance have little or no predictive power on the breadth of 
MAC/MAE provisions (although they do have a predictive effect on the 
value of consideration paid).  These findings provide preliminary support for 
the proposition that acquisition agreements respond to the presence of 
"ambient" uncertainty by expanding the scope and coverage of MAC/MAE 
provisions. 
Although intuitive, the idea that MAC/MAE provisions are a means 
for allocating uncertainty contrasts with the received wisdom in corporate 
law scholarship about the nature and purpose of such terms.  In an important 
treatment of the topic, Ron Gilson and Alan Schwartz advanced the thesis 
                                                                                                             
27-58. 
17See Colin Camerer & Martin Weber, Recent Developments in Modeling Preferences: 
Uncertainty and Ambiguity, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 325, 333 (1992) (discussing "Ellsberg-type 
settings," which demonstrate why individuals pay "substantial amounts to avoid ambiguity"). 
18To capture market uncertainty, I use the Chicago Board of Exchange's "VIX" index, 
sometimes referred to as the "fear index" (and transformations thereof).  For a discussion of the 
relationship between VIX and market uncertainty, see infra note 51. 
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that MAC/MAE terms serve not as an uncertainty or risk allocation device, 
but rather as a means for providing incentives for sellers to make 
investments that complement the deal's "synergies."19  By arming the buyer 
with a credible threat to abandon the deal, they argue, MAC/MAE con-
ditions impose an actuarial cost on sellers who fail to invest adequately.20 
Their "moral hazard" account of MAC/MAEs has proven to be influential 
among numerous scholars and judges.21 
Gilson and Schwartz's moral hazard story is not mutually exclusive 
with ambiguity aversion as a general matter.  It is conceivable that MAC/ 
MAEs serve both purposes (and perhaps others) simultaneously.  The 2007 
and 2008 data I study here, however, do not seem to bear this possibility out 
strongly.22  In any event, the role of ambiguity aversion may prove to be 
significant over the months and years to come, as courts, practitioners, and 
legal scholars increasingly confront the challenge of how to interpret 
analogous terms within an uncertain economic environment. 
A few caveats deserve specific mention before proceeding.  First, my 
conceptual analysis employs a somewhat familiar utilitarian/contractarian 
framework, albeit one that is rooted in behavioral economics.  Specifically, I 
am interested in understanding the characteristics of an "optimal contract" 
between the parties, which I equate with the terms that maximize the parties' 
perceived payoffs as of the time of contracting.  This characterization largely 
spawns both (1) a prediction of the express contract terms the parties adopt if 
bargaining/drafting were costless ex ante, and (2) a prescription about what 
implied (majoritarian) terms courts should employ to save the parties from 
the costs of such express contracting.  I do not explore non-utilitarian 
normative frames, such as the morality of promise keeping or corrective 
justice commitments.  Nor do I explore (possibly) utilitarian normative 
frames concerning minimizing the workload of courts or forcing information 
about prospective ambiguity from an informed party.  While these concepts 
may be worthy alternative normative perspectives, I have nothing to say 
about them here. 
 
                                                                                                             
19Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions, 
21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 330, 357 (2005). 
20Id. at 338-39. 
21Id. at 338.  Outside of the Gilson and Schwartz framework, there may be other plausible 
reasons for parties to adopt MAC/MAE provisions.  A number of practitioners interviewed for this 
essay report that MACs create a reference point around which to encourage deal restructuring when 
necessary.  Alternatively, MACs may create a counter-ballast against private information, mis-
representation, or fraud.  Many of these alternative accounts are consistent with (and may even be 
complementary to) ambiguity aversion.  See infra notes 82-88. 
22I will speculate as to why infra Part IV. 
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A related point concerns the capability limitations of a utili-
tarian/contractarian approach as a normative frame within the realm of 
behavioral economics.  As is well documented, the very notion of utilitarian 
"social welfare" can lose some of its meaning when parties' preferences do 
not remain constant through time or across cognitive domains.23  In such 
situations, a utilitarian normative goal would not only have to consider what 
policy choices maximize some measure of welfare for a given set of utility 
functions, but also would have to compare across different utilitarian frames 
as perceived preferences shift across domains and time, possibly in a manner 
that is possibly endogenous to the legal rule itself.  Not only is this reasoning 
complex, but in contractual settings it also raises the possibility that courts 
should resist simply effectuating the ex ante intent of the parties and should 
instead entertain more paternalistic goals.  This is complicated terrain for 
normative economic theory.  Here, fortunately, my normative commitments 
are much more practical: within contract law settings, if the application of a 
doctrine strays too far from the parties' ex ante interests (or at least their 
perceptions of them), the parties can be expected to subvert it through 
substantially more detailed (and costly) express terms, seeking alternative 
adjudicative forums (such as arbitration), or simply choosing not to contract. 
 Consequently, even if ex ante contractarianism within behavioral economics 
is a troubled normative frame, the volitional nature of contracting implies 
that courts may not be able to stray too far from it.  Viewed in this sense, 
contractarianism still makes a great deal of sense, albeit on pragmatic (rather 
than ideal theory) grounds.24 
The remainder of this essay proceeds as follows.  Part II briefly 
describes the distinction between risk and uncertainty, and canvasses the 
current status of the ambiguity aversion literatures within behavioral finance, 
economics, and law.  Part III develops a simple numerical example of con-
tracting in environments of risk and uncertainty.  Using this example, I show 
that if one or more parties is ambiguity averse, and if the surplus from 
contracting is subject to uncertainty, then the terms of the resulting agree-
ment will generally reflect those preferences.  In cases where prospective 
ambiguity is particularly severe, an optimal contract/interpretive scheme may 
permit the contract to be voided entirely.  In Part IV, I test the intuitions 
 
                                                                                                             
23See, e.g., Aviad Heifetz et al., Market Design with Endogenous Preferences, 58 GAMES & 
ECON. BEHAV. 121, 122 (2007) (noting that "cognitive dispositions appear to be highly context 
specific, rising to first-order importance in certain settings, while curiously marginal in others" 
(citation omitted)). 
24Cf. George G. Triantis, Contractual Allocations of Unknown Risks: A Critique of the 
Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 450, 483 (1992) (questioning 
whether cognitive errors and biases place a limit on the potential for contract law). 
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generated by this example empirically, using data from acquisitions 
agreements announced between 2007 and 2008.  I find that the breadth and 
reach of MAC/MAE clauses appears to be consistently related to market 
uncertainty during negotiations.  This effect persists, moreover, when one 
controls for risk attributes, industry effects, acquirer characteristics, and 
financial control variables.  Section IV proceeds to discuss how one might 
apply the intuitions developed earlier to two well-known cases involving the 
interpretation of MAC/MAE provisions.  Section V concludes the article. 
II.  A BRIEF TOUR THROUGH AMBIGUITY AVERSION 
In order to set the stage for later discussion, this section presents a 
brief review of the distinction between ambiguity and risk, and the related 
concept of ambiguity aversion.  Because this literature is now quite large 
(and still growing), I cannot canvass it in its entirety.  I will instead con-
centrate on some of its core insights, particularly within law, economics, and 
corporate finance. 
Ambiguity aversion is a phenomenon that grows out of the distinction 
between risk and uncertainty.  As noted in the introduction, "risk" refers to a 
type of randomness about which we are sufficiently familiar to characterize 
with objective probabilities.  "Uncertainty" refers to randomness whose 
probabilistic behavior is extremely unfamiliar, unknown, or perhaps even 
unknowable.  Perhaps the most cited example of this distinction (at least 
until recently25) is the canonical thought experiment originally proposed by 
Daniel Ellsberg.26  An individual is asked to choose between two mutually 
exclusive gambles associated with selecting a ball at random from one of 
two urns: "Urn A" is known to contain 100 balls, consisting of 50 red balls 
and 50 blue balls; "Urn B" is also known to contain 100 red and blue balls, 
but their frequencies are left unspecified.  Regardless of which gamble she 
chooses, the individual is told that she will win a monetary prize (say $100) 
if and only if a blue ball is selected from her chosen urn.  In this setting, 
Ellsberg conjectured that most subjects would strictly prefer the Urn A 
 
                                                                                                             
25Ellsberg's formulation may have been recently eclipsed by former Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld's oft-quoted soliloquy on the Iraq war: "[A]s we know, there are known knowns; 
there are things we know we know.  We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we 
know there are some things we do not know.  But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we 
don't know we don't know."  Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Department of Defense 
News Briefing (Feb. 12, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript. 
aspx?transcriptid=2636. 
26See Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J. ECON. 643, 650-51 
(1961) (describing the experiment). 
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gamble over the Urn B gamble.  Ellsberg further conjectured that were the 
experimenter to reverse the stakes, so that the monetary prize in each gamble 
ensues if and only if a red ball is chosen, most individuals would continue 
strictly to prefer Urn A to Urn B.  Although Ellsberg did not attempt to test 
the predictions of his thought experiment, they have been largely confirmed 
in experimental settings, in both within- and between-subject settings.27 
Ellsberg's explanation for Urn A's persistent attractiveness is that it 
represents pure risk rather than uncertainty; that is, in Urn A it is clear that 
the probability of a blue ball is precisely 1/2, neither more nor less. Urn B's 
randomness, in contrast, is imprecise in a way that reflects uncertainty; that 
is, even the probability of drawing a blue ball from Urn B is itself unknown. 
All else constant, Ellsberg conjectured, most individuals would wish to 
avoid the unspecified form of randomness Urn B represents for the "known 
unknown" of Urn A.  It is this persistent preference for risk over uncertainty 
that characterizes ambiguity aversion. 
Ellsworth's conjecture, while intuitive, also poses a serious challenge 
to the received expected utility paradigm developed by von Neumann and 
Morganstern, Savage, and others.28  Savage in particular was interested in 
decision making under uncertainty, and its relationship to the expected utility 
framework.29  He famously demonstrated that even when prior probabilities 
are left unspecified, expected utility theory (or something very close to it) is 
still a viable approach for modeling decision making.30  Rather than using 
"true" objective probability assessments, however, decision makers would be 
represented as assigning consistent subjective probabilities to all plausible 
outcomes.  Using those subjective probabilities (in a consistent fashion), 
decision makers could then be represented theoretically as acting to 
maximize their expected utility, treating their subjective probabilities as 
objective ones. 
As applied to the domain of Ellsbergian urns, Savage's subjective 
expected utility (SEU) framework delivers some important (though 
ultimately troubling) predictions.  Most pertinently, SEU implies that an 
 
                                                                                                             
27For a review, see Camerer & Weber, supra note 17; cf. Craig R. Fox & Amos Tversky, 
Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 540 (2000); 
Craig R. Fox & Amos Tversky, Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance, 110 Q.J. ECON. 
585, 599 (1995) (noting that for some between-subject specifications, the effect can dampen with 
experienced subjects). 
28See LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS 73-82 (1954); JOHN VON 
NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 31-33 
(1944) (introducing briefly the structure of this paradigm). 
29SAVAGE, supra note 28, at 76-77. 
30Id. at 76-81. 
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individual's observed strict preference for Urn A over Urn B in the "blue ball 
wins" condition reveals that she must subjectively believe the ratio of blue 
balls in Urn B to be less than 50%.  At the same time, however, her con-
tinued strict preference for Urn A in the "red ball wins" condition reveals a 
subjective belief that the ratio of red balls in Urn B must be less than 50%. 
Those two beliefs cannot simultaneously be true for any set of consistent 
subjective probabilities, exposing a troubling contradiction.  In effect, ambi-
guity-averse behavior appears to violate one or more tenets of SEU theory, 
making it an unreliable tool for predicting and assessing behavior (at least in 
these contexts).31 
In the last four decades, Ellsberg's challenge to expected utility theory 
subsequently spawned hundreds of efforts among psychologists, philos-
ophers, economists, and others exploring more satisfying alternatives to the 
Savage framework in the presence of ambiguity.32  These efforts have been 
largely directed to formulating alternative axiomatic representations of 
preferences and what they imply for understanding choice under uncertainty. 
A particularly noteworthy branch of that literature focuses on what has 
become known as the multiple priors approach.33  Put simply, this approach 
posits that in uncertain environments decision makers will assemble all 
plausible probabilistic attributes of an uncertain state and then formulate a 
probability distribution over those environments (a probability distribution of 
probabilities, of sorts).34  In the Ellsberg thought experiment, for example, 
one could imagine a decision maker formulating 101 different plausible 
priors about the number of blue balls in Urn B (and thus the probability of a 
blue ball selection).35  Once these multiple plausible prior probabilities are 
assembled, the decision maker would attempt to assign a subjective 
likelihood to each one of them.  An ambiguity-neutral person might, for 
example, assign a uniform probability to each one of the 101 red-blue ball 
 
                                                                                                             
31This is not to say, of course, that SEU is categorically a poor theory, but rather that its 
predictive powers are likely domain specific.  See Colin Camerer & Eric Talley, Experimental Study 
of Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky eds., 
2007).  Indeed, neuro-economists have begun to formalize ways in which behavior consistent with 
expected utility versus prospect theory may be context specific.  See generally Jennifer H. Arlen & 
Eric L. Talley, Experimental Law and Economics: Introduction, in EXPERIMENTAL LAW AND 
ECONOMICS (Jennifer H. Arlen & Eric L. Talley eds., 2008). 
32For a good review, see generally Mark J. Machina, Non-Expected Utility Theory, in THE 
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (Steven N. Darlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 
2008). 
33See Itzhak Gilboa et al., Probability and Uncertainty in Economic Modeling, 22 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 173, 182-84 (2008) (surveying assorted applications of the multiple priors approach). 
34Id. at 182. 
35That is {0 Blue; 100 Red}, {1 Blue; 99 Red}, {2 Blue; 98 Red}, and so forth. 
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possibilities (at least in the absence of additional information).  Such an 
assignment would be consistent with SEU, which effectively requires that 
one's prior probabilities be independent of the stakes assigned to any partic-
ular gamble.36  It would be inconsistent, however, with the behavior pre-
dicted by Ellsberg. 
An ambiguity-averse decision maker, in contrast, would tend to skew 
her priors in a manner that is responsive to how the stakes in the problem are 
presented.  Consider, for instance, perhaps the most popular representation 
of ambiguity aversion in the behavioral economics literature: Maximin 
Expected Utility (MEU).37  Under the MEU approach, an ambiguity-averse 
decision maker assigns full "weight" to the prior probability assessment that 
makes her worst-off under the posited gamble.  If one changes the stakes or 
nature of the gamble, the worst-off assessment may change as well, which 
can generate inconsistent probabilistic assessments.  Going back to the Ells-
berg example, in the "blue ball wins" condition, the decision maker's assess-
ment of Urn B would focus solely on her worst case scenario (i.e., that it 
contains 100 red balls and 0 blue balls).  For this person, Urn A would 
clearly dominate.  In the "red ball wins" condition, the stakes of the gamble 
are reversed, and so with them is the worst case; here, the decision maker 
would focus on the polar opposite assessment (i.e., that it contains 100 blue 
balls and 0 red balls), and Urn A persists as the dominant choice.  Note that 
both the SEU and MEU decision makers assign prior probability 
distributions to different outcomes, assessing the expected utility of a 
candidate's choice under those priors.  Unlike her SEU counterpart, however, 
the MEU decision maker selects priors that are themselves potentially 
inconsistent, predicated in part on the underlying stakes of the gamble.38 
 
                                                                                                             
36See SAVAGE, supra note 28, at 73-76. 
37The MEU approach has been developed in various forms.  S.L. HURLEY, NATURAL 
REASONS: PERSONALITY AND POLITY 371-82 (1992); Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, Maxmin 
Expected Utility with a Non-Unique Prior, 18 J. MATHEMATICAL ECON. 141, 142-43 (1989) (dif-
ferentiating the authors' vision of MEU from other models).  For a review, see generally Gilboa et 
al., supra note 33. 
Although it is the most focal, MEU is but one of many competing ways that have been 
suggested to formalize the concept of ambiguity aversion.  CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE 
SCENARIOS (2007) (discussing  the "Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle," which operates in 
part on a distinction between risk and uncertainty); see also Peter Klibanoff et al., A Smooth Model 
of Decision Making Under Ambiguity, 73 ECONOMETRICA 1849, 1852 (2005) (offering "a 
clarifying perspective on ambiguity and ambiguity attitude"); Peter Klibanoff et al., Recursive 
Smooth Ambiguity Preferences 1 (Fondazione Collegio Carlo Alberto, Working Paper No. 17, 
2008), available at http://www.carloalberto.org/files/no.17.pdf (distinguishing between "ambiguity" 
and "ambiguity attitude").  See generally Machina, supra note 32.  To some extent, no clear victor 
has emerged from this debate. 
38Although MEU preferences were axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler within 
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In some settings, ambiguity aversion can elicit behavior that resembles 
either (1) severe risk aversion, or (2) the presence of "cataclysmic" forms of 
risk.39  Ambiguity avoiders, all else constant, shy away from environments 
that entail appreciable unpredictability.  They discount upside relative to 
downside variations.  They are willing to purchase insurance at substantial 
premia over actuarial cost.  Many of these predictions hold for risk-averse 
individuals too, at least for the right degree of risk aversion or magnitude of 
underlying risk.  Nevertheless, ambiguity aversion is not only a distinct 
theoretical concept, but it can sometimes manifest itself in ways that are both 
distinguishable and independent from risk aversion.40 
Experimental evidence of ambiguity aversion suggests that it is most 
likely to manifest in settings where the underlying random process is new or 
poorly understood.  Once subjects gain greater familiarity and confidence 
with their environment (effectively building an experiential "data set" on 
which to base their priors) ambiguity aversion tends to dissipate.41  Risk 
aversion, in contrast, should not.  Moreover, in a number of documented 
cases, the correlation between risk attitudes and ambiguity attitudes appears 
notably low, and ambiguity aversion alone (controlling for risk aversion) 
appears responsible for substantial premia that experimental subjects have 
been willing to pay to avoid uncertainty independent of risk—in the 
neighborhood of 10% to 20% of expected value.42  Similar qualitative effects 
can be detected even in experimental market settings among experienced, 
sophisticated traders.43 
Outside of the laboratory, ambiguity aversion has begun to play a 
prominent role in empirical work, particularly within the behavioral finance 
literature on the limits of arbitrage.44  Ambiguity aversion, for example, is 
                                                                                                             
economics, in at least a conceptual sense, this approach also traces roots back to John Rawls.  Gilboa 
& Schmeidler, supra note 37; see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 152-154 (1971); see also 
HURLEY, supra note 37, at 374 (discussing "Rawlsian resistance to the equiprobability assumption"); 
Stephen M. Gardiner, A Core Precautionary Principle, 14 J. POL. PHIL. 33, 45-49 (2006) (similarly 
discussing Rawlsian theory). 
39See, e.g., Eric L. Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk Among Big Four Auditors, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1644 (2006). 
40See Camerer & Weber, supra note 17, at 357. 
41Id. at 326. 
42Id. at 340-41. 
43See, e.g., Colin F. Camerer, Do Biases in Probability Judgment Matter in Markets?  
Experimental Evidence, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 981, 985, 995 (1987); Camerer & Weber, supra note 
17, at 356-57.  The magnitudes of such effects tend to decrease as subjects become more familiar 
with the random attributes of the underlying environment.  Colin Camerer & Howard Kunreuther, 
Experimental Markets for Insurance, 2 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 265, 285-86 (1989); see Fox & 
Tversky, supra note 27, at 602 (stating that investors "may exhibit ambiguity aversion" when 
considering investment choices independently). 
44See generally Nicholas Barberis & Richard Thaler, A Survey of Behavioral Finance, in 
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thought to be a prime driver (perhaps one of many) of the "equity premium" 
puzzle—the observed stylized fact that average buy-and-hold returns in 
equity investments during the last 150 years have been so high as to defy 
justification as a plausible artifact of risk aversion.45  The observed premium, 
however, is more consistent with the presence of both risk and ambiguity 
aversion (in particular, investors' fear that their specified beliefs about asset 
pricing relationships are wrong), which can cause investors to demand larger 
expected returns.46  In addition, ambiguity aversion may help explain why 
some investors fail to diversify their investments in general,47 and in 
particular, the observed bias in both individual and institutional investors' 
portfolios towards "home field" issuers (i.e., companies traded on domestic 
markets and/or headquartered near investor's domicile).48 
More recently, financial economists have begun to amass evidence 
that market volatility may also be systematically related to ambiguity 
aversion.  Consider, for example the Chicago Board Options Exchange's 
(CBOE) volatility index "VIX," which captures average volatility inferred 
from a collection of put and call option markets.  VIX is popularly known as 
the "fear index" and is described by the business press as a reflection of 
investors' sense of unease due to the uncertainty present in the market.49  The 
value of VIX has generally fluctuated between 8% and 20% during the four 
years prior to the summer of 2007.  As Figure 1 below suggests, VIX grew 
particularly erratically beginning in the third quarter of 2007.  Since 
September 2008, it skyrocketed to over 90% before settling back down 
somewhat. 
 
                                                                                                             
THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE: VOLUME 1B FINANCIAL MARKETS AND ASSET 
PRICING 1053 (George M. Constantinides et al. eds., 2003). 
45Rajnish Mehra & Edward C. Prescott, The Equity Premium in Retrospect, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE, supra note 44, at 892-96. 
46See, e.g., Pascal J. Maenhout, Robust Portfolio Rules and Asset Pricing, 17 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 951, 952-53 (2004). 
47Id. at 976-77; see also Sujoy Mukerji & Jean-Marc Tallon, Ambiguity Aversion and 
Incompleteness of Financial Markets, 68 REV. ECON. STUD. 883, 898 (2001) ("[S]tandard theory 
argues that diversification would . . . reduce the inconvenience of [] risk [but] [a]mbiguity aversion 
can actually exacerbate [this] tension."). 
48See, e.g., Shlomo Benartzi, Excessive Extrapolation and the Allocation of 401(k) Accounts 
to Company Stock, 56 J. FIN. 1747, 1761 (2001) (discussing "familiarity bias"); Kenneth R. French 
& James M. Poterba, Investor Diversification and International Equity Markets, 81 AM. ECON. 
REV. 222, 225 (1991) (describing how investors "impute extra 'risk' to foreign markets"); Gur 
Huberman, Familiarity Breeds Investment, 14 REV. FIN. STUD. 659, 659 (2001) (stating that "by 
and large," investors keep their money in their home country). 
49See Tom Lauricella & Aaron Lucchetti, Dow Slides Again, Down 514.45; S&P at a 5-
Year Low; What's Behind the Surge in the VIX?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2008, at C1. 
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Figure 1.  VIX Close, Feb. 2007-Oct. 2008 
 
Classical finance theory suggests that it should matter little whether 
volatility comes from upward market movements, downward market 
movements, or gyrations around a stationary point for determining the 
realized value of the VIX.  But a number of recent studies have demon-
strated that VIX manifests an asymmetric response to market movements, 
growing disproportionately large when markets are falling.50  Such observa-
tions are not generally predicted by standard expected utility theory, but 
would be a logical consequence of ambiguity aversion.51 
Although ambiguity aversion has not colonized legal scholarship to 
the same extent that it has behavioral economics and finance, many have 
seized upon the concept to understand or criticize legal doctrines within 
numerous fields, including environmental law,52 administrative law,53 
 
                                                                                                             
50E.g., Ann Marie Hibbert et al., A Behavioral Explanation for the Negative Symmetric 
Return-Volatility Relation, 32 J. BANKING & FIN. 2254, 2255 (2008); Cheekiat Low, The Fear and 
Exuberance from Implied Volatility of S&P 100 Index Options, 77 J. BUS. 527, 543-44 (2004) 
(concluding that VIX is the "best aggregate index of [the] fear or sentiment of sophisticated" 
investors). 
51Relatedly, a number of financial economists have begun to use VIX (or a transformation of 
it) as a basis for capturing market uncertainty.  See Tim Bollerslev et al., Expected Stock Returns 
and Variance Risk Premia 16 (Duke Dep't Econ. Research Paper No. 5, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=948309 ("[r]ely[ing] on the readily available squared VIX index as [the] 
measure for the risk-neutral expected variance."); Itamar Drechsler & Amir Yaron, What's Vol Got 
to Do With It 1 (Dec. 2008) (unpublished working paper, 2008) (on file with the Am. Fin. Ass'n) 
(concluding that "the variance premium is intimately linked to [economic] uncertainty" and helps to 
predict investment activity. 
52See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 37. 
53See, e.g., VERMEULE, supra note 16, at 183 (suggesting that judges defer to administrative 
agencies rather than "fill in the gaps" of ambiguous statutory language). 
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criminal law,54 and torts.55  Contract law scholars also have taken on the 
topic within specific settings, predominantly focusing on the reticence that 
contracting parties frequently have towards experimenting with terms that 
diverge from widely accepted default rules or familiar terms.56  Ambiguity 
aversion has garnered somewhat less attention among contracts scholars 
operating within other domains, including conditions/excuse doctrine.57  Yet 
some theoretical contributions in contract theory have demonstrated that 
ambiguity aversion (or prospective ambiguity aversion) can be a cause for 
contractual "incompleteness": i.e., parties may fail to specify contractual 
allocations in contingencies where uncertainty is especially pronounced.58  In 
those contingencies, the argument goes, ambiguity aversion can swamp other 
gains from trade.  This consequence of ambiguity aversion holds particular 
relevance for my inquiry, since within law, the doctrines of express and 
 
                                                                                                             
54See, e.g., Uzi Segal & Alex Stein, Ambiguity Aversion and the Criminal Process, 81 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1549 (2006) (stating that the frequency of plea bargains is in part 
attributable to a criminal defendant's ambiguity aversion vis-à-vis jury trials). 
55See, e.g., Joshua C. Teitelbaum, A Unilateral Accident Model Under Ambiguity, 36 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 431, 464 (2007) (describing how a tortfeasor's attitude towards risk impacts accident 
models). 
56See Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 651, 651-53 (2006) (deviating from default rules and other norms may discourage 
counterparts from entering an agreement); Russel Korobkin, Intertia and Preference in Contract 
Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 
1586 (1998) (explaining the "status quo bias" that affects contract negotiations). 
57Although most of the literature here has focused on risk versus uncertainty—for example, 
Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: 
An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 87-88 (1977)—two exceptions warrant specific 
mention.  First, Schwartz notes in passing that ambiguity aversion may induce the parties to 
void/exit a contract.  Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract 
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 607 n.139 (2003).  However, Schwartz then concludes that "filling gaps 
with state-created rules or standards would not advance the parties' objectives."  Id.  While this 
conclusion might be true, it would depend on the nature of the gap-filling rule.  A gap-filler that 
simply reflects the contingent preferences of the parties would seemingly advance their objectives. 
Triantis considers the doctrine of commercial impracticability's role as a gap filler.  Triantis, 
supra note 24, at 451-52.  His analysis draws on the then-emerging literature on risk versus uncer-
tainty.  Id. at 459 n.24.  Triantis is ultimately skeptical of implied conditions as a means for gap 
filling, concluding that market forces and evolutionary learning are better mechanisms for addressing 
poor uncertainty management.  Id. at 453. 
At its core, Triantis' argument concerns how best to set a default rule, as opposed to whether 
a court should enforce express conditions (such as MAC/MAE provisions).  Id. at 452.  On the 
question of the optimal default rule, much of his argument appears to rest on faith that market forces 
and arbitrage will effectively "de-bias" decision makers or dissipate the effects of cognitive error.  
Id. at 468-74.  As noted above, recent contributions in behavioral finance have called this faith into 
question (at least as a universal proposition). 
58See, e.g., Sujoy Mukerji, Ambiguity Aversion and Incompleteness of Contractual Form, 
88 AM. ECON. REV. 1207, 1207 (1998) ("Casual empiricism suggests that a real-world contract is 
very often incomplete in the sense that it may not include any instruction for some possible event."). 
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implied conditions represent a core mechanism with which a court can "un-
complete" a contract.  How and when this mechanism is activated is the 
question to which I now turn. 
III.  A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
In order to make my arguments more concrete, this section develops 
and analyzes a simple numerical example to illustrate how contract design 
may attempt to allocate both risk and uncertainty.  The goal here is not to 
offer a complete account of contracting with uncertainty, but rather to use 
the example to expose some simple (and potentially testable) intuitions about 
(1) how ambiguity and aversion thereto may plausibly be reflected in 
contractual terms, and (2) how ambiguity-averse parties may be willing (at 
least in certain circumstances) to make the contract's very enforceability 
contingent on the "ambient" amount of uncertainty they face. 
A.  Framework 
Consider Bianca, a potential buyer, and Sam, a potential seller, who 
are negotiating a potential sales contract for a specified asset (say, a small 
bakery that Sam has inherited from his grandmother). The business asset is 
indivisible, and thus if a sale occurs, Bianca receives full control of the 
business (though the parties can decide to divide its cash flows in a manner 
described below).  Should Bianca purchase the business, its future value 
under her stewardship is not certain: it could be a relative "success" (if, say, 
there is a sudden spike in donut demand), in which case it will have 
monetary value of $500.  Alternatively, it could be a relative "failure," and 
have monetary value of $100.  I presume that even Bianca does not know at 
the time of contracting what the value of her stewardship will be, but at the 
time of her decision to perform or breach, she will privately observe it.  If 
Bianca does not purchase the business (or if her performance is later 
excused, or if she breaches), she can continue under the status quo ante and 
obtain an outside payoff of $125.59 
In contrast to Bianca, Sam has little business acumen, and under his 
stewardship the business will simply be liquidated for $50 (with certainty).  
However, outside of his negotiations with Bianca, Sam has an option of 
selling the business to a willing third party, who has offered him $140 for it 
 
                                                                                                             
59Note that because Bianca's outside payoff exceeds the value of the business to her in the 
event of a "failure," it will be efficient for Bianca not to perform in such a context. 
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free and clear.60  Passing up this outside offer is costly for Sam; he can only 
keep the outside bidder in play for a limited amount of time, and if he waits 
too long the outside bid will evaporate.61 
The contract between Sam and Bianca will have three chief 
functions—first, it may transfer control over the business asset to Bianca; 
second, it allows for Sam and Bianca to allocate risk; and finally, it allows 
for Sam and Bianca to allocate uncertainty (to the extent that they wish to). 
B.  Risk Preferences 
To distinguish the effects of risk versus those of uncertainty, it will be 
instructive to allow for Sam and Bianca to be risk averse, so that each would 
strictly prefer a certain dollar payment over any risky asset with the same 
actuarial value.  Such preferences, common within the law and economics 
literature, can be represented by an increasing, concave utility function for 
each party, which I will denote uS (y) and uB (y), respectively, where y 
denotes the party's wealth.  Figure 2 below demonstrates this now familiar 
framework for Bianca, imagining that she owned the asset (and all cash 
flows) outright.  In the figure, Bianca's utility function is pictured by the 
function u (y).  In the Figure (as well the ensuing example), I will suppose 
that Sam's and Bianca's preferences both take the well known form of risk 
aversion, where u (y) = ln (y) and where ln denotes the natural logarithm.62 
 
                                                                                                             
60Note that this formulation assumes away the possibility of "common values" between 
Bianca and Sam.  I do so for the sake of simplicity.  Including the possibility of common values does 
not generally cause ambiguity aversion to dissipate, and can in some instances exacerbate it.  Cf. 
Theodore L. Turocy, Auction Choice for Ambiguity-Averse Sellers Facing Strategic Uncertainty, 62 
GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 155 (2008). 
61Just how quickly this outside opportunity evaporates after Sam and Bianca contract with 
one another is taken up below. 
62This functional form is sometimes referred to as constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).  
It is a special case of a more general class of functions with the form u (y) = (y1 ρ – 1)/(1 – ρ), where 
ρ is a constant representing the degree of risk aversion.  Note that when ρ = 0, the utility function is 
linear, corresponding to risk neutrality.  When ρ = 1, in contrast, this function collapses to u (y) = ln 
(y), as discussed in the text. 
2009] ON UNCERTAINTY, AMBIGUITY, AND CONTRACTUAL CONDITIONS 773 
 
 
Figure 2.  Expected Utility Framework 
Note that while Bianca's utility increases in wealth, it does so at a 
decreasing rate—the sine qua non of risk aversion.  The payoff Bianca 
derives (in utility terms) from the low outcome ($100) is pictured on the 
vertical axis at u ($100).  Similarly, her utility payoff from the high outcome 
($500) is pictured on the vertical axis at u ($500).  If we suppose a 
successful outcome occurs with a probability of 50% (a supposition I will 
return to below), then Bianca's expected utility is simply the midpoint of 
these two utilities, and is denoted on the vertical axis63 as Eu|π=1/2. 
One can also work backwards within this diagram, asking hypo-
thetically how large of a fixed and certain monetary payment would make 
Bianca indifferent between the money and the risky cash flows from the 
business.  In the diagram above, this "certainty equivalent" of the gamble to 
Bianca is approximately $223.61.  In other words, Bianca's aversion to risk 
alone would lead her to value the business at $72.39 less than its actuarial 
value ($300 = $ ½ · (500+100)).  This difference is sometimes called the 
 
                                                                                                             
63More generally, for asymmetric probabilities other than ½, this would be the probability-
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"risk premium" that Bianca would associate with holding all the risk (though 
in this case, since Bianca is the prospective buyer, it might be more 
accurately called a "risk discount"). 
C.  Risk/Uncertainty 
In order to illustrate the chief claims in this article, our running 
example must also have a way to think about uncertainty as distinct from 
risk.  Thus, suppose that the probability that the business is ultimately a 
success (or π) is not known with precision, but instead is confined within 
some range centered at 50%.  Specifically, suppose the probability of 
success could be anywhere between 50% - c on the low end or 50% + c on 
the high end (as pictured in the figure below), where c captures the degree of 
ambiguity surrounding that probability.  The larger the value of c, the less 
precision one has in bounding the "true" probability of success, though its 
plausible interval is always centered at 50%.  Conversely, when c is very low 
(or zero), the probability of a high value collapses completely to the case of 
pure risk, at 50%. 
 
Figure 3.  Interval of Prior Probabilities 
Significantly, other than knowing c (which defines the range of 
plausible prior probabilities), neither Sam nor Bianca has any additional 
information about the actual probability of success.  It is this lack of informa-
tion about prior probabilities that gives rise to a central concern in the am-
biguity aversion literature. 
To the extent that Sam or Bianca cares about ambiguity, their contract 
may attempt to account for or accommodate those preferences.  Thus, the 
following subsections will track two possible scenarios (and then ultimately 
combine them).  In the first, I will consider the case of pure risk, where c is 
effectively 0%.  This scenario corresponds to the analog of the proverbial 
Ellsbergian urn with a known fraction of blue and red balls.  In the second 
scenario, I will consider what happens when c is strictly positive. This 
scenario corresponds with the uncertain urn. 
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D.  Contracting Under Risk 
Consider first how the parties would negotiate possible terms of a 
sales contract in an environment with risk but no ambiguity (i.e., where c = 
0).  Among other things, the contract will determine whether the asset is 
transferred to Bianca and how much she pays for it, as well as whether she 
will breach.  Because only Bianca observes her true valuation of the asset, 
the contract will not be able to specify a price that hinges on that value.  
However, the parties can negotiate terms that turn on whether Bianca shows 
up to close the deal or instead breaches.  Accordingly, suppose that they 
agree to a contract price (denoted P) in the event that Bianca performs, but 
also include a cancellation fee, or liquidated damages amount (denoted D), if 
Bianca breaches. 
What is the nature of the contract they will produce (if any)?  The 
answer to this question can depend on many factors, including the bargain-
ing protocols used by the parties.  In what follows, I will not attempt to limit 
analysis to a specific bargaining protocol, but instead will simply posit that 
the parties' contract will maximize the sum of their expected utilities at the 
time of contracting, subject to the condition that neither party can expect to 
be made worse off than her outside option by contracting (i.e., it is weakly 
Pareto improving).  If a contract satisfies this property, I will refer to it as an 
"optimal contract." 
As it turns out, our example yields a unique optimal contract, which 
calls for a contract price of $500/2 = $250 and cancellation fee of ($125 - 
$50)/2 = $37.50 in the event of breach by Bianca.  Brief inspection reveals 
that these terms literally divide the cash flows (and thus economic risks) in 
half.  If the store turns out to be worth $500, Bianca will not breach, and the 
parties will split the $500 surplus.  If it turns out to be of low value, 
however, she will breach (efficiently), and will pay $37.50 to Sam.  In this 
case, the net result is that they both end up with $87.50.  This splitting of 
risks should not be surprising, given that there are two sources of gain from 
contracting.  First, there may be direct allocational efficiency gains from 
trade when Bianca controls the business in the event its value is high, and 
breaches (efficiently) when its value is low.64  Second, there are also gains 
from risk allocation if Sam and Bianca co-insure one another against upside 
and downside risk.  The optimal contract, in effect, seizes both sources of 
 
                                                                                                             
64It might first appear that breach by Bianca is inefficient when the value of the business is 
low, since it would still be worth $100 under Bianca's stewardship, and Sam can only operate it at a 
profit of $50.  Nevertheless, this decision is efficient because by breaching, Bianca can capture her 
$125 outside option in addition to the payoff received by Sam. 
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efficiency gain.  The resulting expected payoff has a certainty equivalent of 
$147.90 for each party, which clearly exceeds the payoffs that Sam and 
Bianca would achieve through their ex ante outside options ($140 and $125, 
respectively).  Thus, the optimal risk-sharing contract described above is also 
Pareto efficient. 
Before moving on to thinking about uncertainty, it is perhaps 
worthwhile to take note of three features of Sam and Bianca's contract in the 
case of pure risk.  First, note that the liquidated damages amount, $37.50, 
need not reflect the usually conceived expectation damages that courts might 
apply. In particular, the optimal contract would not entitle Sam to a full 
action for the price (of $250), nor would it entitle Bianca to walk from the 
deal.  This potential divergence from the usual contractual remedies is well 
known in the literature on contractual risk allocation.65  Because of the 
benefits of co-insurance, they can do better than having Bianca fully ensure 
Sam against a breach (which is what an action for the price would entail).  In 
essence, by agreeing to this lower quantum of damages, Sam receives a 
larger price from Bianca up front, and both are better off. 
Second, note that the equal sharing of risks between Bianca and Sam 
emanates from the fact that they are assumed to be equally risk averse.  If the 
parties were to have different risk preferences, they might settle on different 
values for the price and cancellation fee, with one party effectively under-
writing insurance for the other, according to their relative degrees of risk 
aversion.66 
Finally, note that even though the contract clearly envisions that 
Bianca will breach in the low profitability state, it does not allow her simply 
to walk away without paying anything to Sam (that is, the cancellation 
fee/liquidated damages amount is strictly positive).  Indeed, a nontrivial 
source of gains from trade in this example is the efficient allocation of risk 
ex ante; as such, part of the benefit from contracting comes from the dam-
ages payment Bianca makes to Sam.67  Allowing her to abandon her contrac-
tual duties without paying damages would undermine this benefit. 
 
                                                                                                             
65E.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky, Risk Sharing Through Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 427, 427 (1983); Steven Shavell, Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to 
Sale, 25 RAND J.ECON. 20, 34-35 (1994). 
66See, e.g., Polinsky, supra note 65, at 436 (promoting the "liquidated damages [contractual] 
remedy," which accounts for the parties' risk aversion by setting damages before a breach occurs).  
In addition, if one were to increase the extent to which Sam and Bianca are risk averse, the total 
gains from the proposed transaction would decline. 
67See, e.g., id. 
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E.  Contracting Under Uncertainty 
Now consider what might happen if the parties found themselves in a 
context of uncertainty instead of pure risk.  If, for example, c = 30%, then 
the plausible value of π could range anywhere between 20% and 80% (but 
otherwise little else is known about it).  What sort of contracting behavior 
can we expect?  The environment of uncertainty requires us to enrich our 
running example in two respects.  First, we must posit how decision makers 
form subjective beliefs or conjectures about their environment.  Second, we 
must posit how (if at all) the parties' deep preferences treat uncertainty/ 
ambiguity in a different way than risk. 
1.  Ambiguity Neutrality 
Let us first consider how one might analyze the Sam-Bianca contract 
in a situation where the parties are risk averse but ambiguity neutral.  Within 
the Savage framework, one cannot proceed without first positing how Sam 
and Bianca assign values (or probabilistic assessments) to the underlying 
probability value distributions. 
It is important to note that there are no general constraints within the 
Savage framework on how parties form priors.  Other than the true proba-
bility, π must range between 50% - c and 50% + c.  Nevertheless, for at least 
intuitive reasons, many economists, statisticians, and philosophers have (by 
turn) been attracted to one candidate (at least for uncertainty-neutral decision 
makers): a prior belief assigning equal probability to each possible value of 
π—i.e., a "uniform" distribution on π over its plausible range.  The intuition 
of equating uninformed with uniform priors is sometimes referred to as the 
"Principle of Insufficient Reason."  It is in essence a conjecture, and it is not 
completely free from criticism.68  However, it draws support from intuition, 
from experimental evidence,69 and (somewhat selectively) from theory.70  I 
therefore embrace it provisionally—at least for the purpose of illustration—
though my arguments would work with a wide range of alternative prior 
distributions as well. 
 
                                                                                                             
68See Hans-Werner Sinn, A Rehabilitation of the Principle of Insufficient Reason, 94 Q.J. 
ECON. 493, 504-05 (1980) (reviewing the criticism and offering a normative attempt at rehabili-
tation). 
69E.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 37, at 166-67. 
70See MORRIS H. DEGROOT, OPTIMAL STATISTICAL DECISIONS 198-99 (1970) (advocating 
uniform uninformed priors assumption, describing a proper and improper uniform prior's statistical 
properties, and identifying other monikers for the assumption). 
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If Sam and Bianca are both ambiguity neutral, then the Principle of 
Insufficient Reason provides the last piece of the puzzle for locking in 
predictions about their contracting behavior: it immediately follows that the 
expected probability of the high value state would simply be the midpoint 
between 50% - c and 50% + c—or 50%, just as in the pure risk state.  
Consequently, all aspects of the optimal contracting problem and resulting 
payoffs discussed in the previous section remain unchanged.  Bianca 
receives a right to the asset, paying a price P = $250, but has the option of 
breaching and paying D = $37.50.  Each party receives a payoff in certainty 
equivalent terms of $147.90, just as before. 
2.  Ambiguity Aversion 
Things do change, however, if at least one of the parties is ambiguity 
averse.  Consider what might happen if one of the bargaining parties (say, 
our buyer Bianca) harbored MEU preferences.  In this case, for each possible 
contract that Bianca might agree to, she would assign prior probabilities of 
success that generate the minimal conceivable utility payoff that the contract 
could yield for her, equating that value to her perceived expected utility 
under the contract.  She will then bargain for contractual terms (if any) that 
maximize this minimal utility.  Within this example, Bianca's perceived pay-
off would generally attach the most pessimistic probability, or 50% - c, to a 
successful outcome.71 
Just as before, Bianca and Sam's contract (if any) will determine (1) 
whether Bianca receives the right to control the asset; and (2) what the price 
and damages payment will be.  Now, however, it will do so with reference to 
the sum of Bianca's maxmin expected utility.  The effect of this substitution 
will tend to comport with one's intuition; that is, the large weight that Bianca 
puts on the worst case scenario implies that Sam may find it optimal to give 
Bianca "downside protection," in the form of a moderated cancellation fee, 
should Bianca breach.  In exchange for this downside protection, Sam may 
take a larger portion of the upside benefit if the asset turns out to be high 
value, in the form of a higher price.  This makes sense, since Bianca—as an 
ambiguity-averse party—cares less about upside payoffs. 
Note, of course, that the prospect of giving Bianca some downside 
protection is potentially costly to Sam, since he is a risk averse party, but this 
 
                                                                                                             
71Note that this statement would not hold for a contract that (counterintuitively) awarded 
Bianca more money when the project is unsuccessful than when it is successful.  For such hypo-
thetical terms, her MEU preferences would utilize a "worst case" prior of 50% + c.  Given Sam's risk 
aversion, however, none of the counterintuitive contracts is a reasonable contender in this example. 
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protection may be necessary simply to get Bianca to participate in the 
contract (so long as Bianca is willing to pay enough for it). 
 
Table 1.  Optimal Contract Terms; Ambiguity  
Neutrality vs. Buyer-Side Ambiguity Aversion 
 
Table 1 illustrates the terms of an optimal contract between Bianca 
and Sam for various values of uncertainty, comparing the cases of (1) sym-
metric ambiguity neutrality, with (2) buyer-side ambiguity aversion.  Note 
that as ambiguity rises (c goes up), the terms of the optimal contract for risk-
averse parties do not vary (since uncertainty is increasing symmetrically 
around ½).  On the other hand, when Bianca is ambiguity averse, the terms 
of the contract change in the manner suggested above.  That is, the parties 
agree to a higher price but a more moderated termination fee, with Sam 
implicitly underwriting "uncertainty insurance" for Bianca.  However, once c 
grows sufficiently large (approximately 28% in this example), the optimal 
contract becomes no contract at all.  In other words, once ambiguity grows 
sufficiently pronounced, Sam requires such a large price premium that 
Bianca is no longer willing to provide it.  At this point, autarky is strictly 
preferable to trade. 
Table 2 below extends this thought experiment to consider other 
permutations of ambiguity aversion between the parties.  When only Sam is 
ambiguity averse (third panel), the dynamics are qualitatively similar (though 
directionally reversed).  As ambiguity increases, Bianca provides downside 
protection to Sam in the form of successively higher cancellation fees, but 
she simultaneously extracts a lower price.  As with the case of buyer-side 
ambiguity aversion, once the value of c grows sufficiently large (around 23% 
in this case), Bianca is no longer willing to provide downside protection, and 
once again autarky is strictly preferable to trade. 
 Ambiguity Aversion 
 Neither is A.A. Buyer is A.A 
c Price Damages Price Damages 
0% $250.00 $37.50 $250.00 $37.50 
5% $250.00 $37.50 $263.16 $33.33 
10% $250.00 $37.50 $277.78 $29.55 
15% $250.00 $37.50 $294.12 $26.09 
20% $250.00 $37.50 $307.50 $21.12 
25% $250.00 $37.50 $318.55 $14.60 
30% $250.00 $37.50 Autarky Autarky 
35% $250.00 $37.50 Autarky Autarky 
40% $250.00 $37.50 Autarky Autarky 
45% $250.00 $37.50 Autarky Autarky 
50% $250.00 $37.50 Autarky Autarky 
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Table 2.  Optimal Contractual Terms 
for Various Permutations of Ambiguity Aversion 
 
In the case where both parties are ambiguity averse, a similar effect 
takes hold.  Note that in this case, price and damages move in the same 
direction.  Indeed, because both parties are ambiguity averse, they are both 
generally reticent to provide downside protection to each other.  But because 
Sam's outside option (ex ante) is more attractive than Bianca's, she may have 
to offer him better terms across the board to keep him in the deal.  And thus, 
at least initially, both the price and cancellation fee increase with the 
parameter c.  Nevertheless, just as in the previous permutations, uncertainty 
can reach a threshold at which autarky becomes strictly preferred to trade.  In 
fact, due to the two-sided effects of ambiguity aversion, the autarky 
threshold is even closer than the other cases. 
3.  Hybrid Environments and Contingent Autarky 
The analysis thus far has largely been confined to contractual 
environments where the ambient degree of uncertainty is fixed and known 
during negotiation.  When uncertainty is sufficiently low, ambiguity-averse 
parties may choose to contract, using the terms of the deal to allocate 
ambiguity as well as risk.  When uncertainty is high, however, parties may 
simply choose not to contract.  Limited to these two comparisons, there is 
not much of an interesting story to be told for contractual conditions, 
MAC/MAE clauses, or other forms of contract excuses.  Such interventions 
become more interesting in "hybrid" situations when the parties do not know 
 Ambiguity Aversion 
 Neither is A.A. Only Buyer is A.A Only Seller is A.A. Both are A.A. 
c Price Damages Price Damages Price Damages Price Damages 
0% $250.00 $37.50 $250.00 $37.50 $250.00 $37.50 $250.00 $37.50 
5% $250.00 $37.50 $263.16 $33.33 $236.84 $41.67 $250.00 $37.50 
10% $250.00 $37.50 $277.78 $29.55 $233.75 $49.48 $262.85 $41.99 
15% $250.00 $37.50 $294.12 $26.09 $229.89 $57.19 Autarky Autarky 
20% $250.00 $37.50 $307.50 $21.12 $223.88 $58.73 Autarky Autarky 
25% $250.00 $37.50 $318.55 $14.60 Autarky Autarky Autarky Autarky 
30% $250.00 $37.50 Autarky Autarky Autarky Autarky Autarky Autarky 
35% $250.00 $37.50 Autarky Autarky Autarky Autarky Autarky Autarky 
40% $250.00 $37.50 Autarky Autarky Autarky Autarky Autarky Autarky 
45% $250.00 $37.50 Autarky Autarky Autarky Autarky Autarky Autarky 
50% $250.00 $37.50 Autarky Autarky Autarky Autarky Autarky Autarky 
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ex ante whether conditions will remain within the realm of known risks, or 
instead could evolve in uncertain directions. 
In our running example, suppose that at the time of contracting, 
Bianca and Sam think they are plausibly executing their contract in an 
environment of pure risk (or c = 0%); however, they recognize that with 
some probability (call it q), the environment is (or could become) typified by 
uncertainty so large as to deplete any gains from trade (e.g., c = 50%).  
Suppose further that they will learn more about ambient uncertainty shortly 
after executing their deal (and before Sam loses his alternative buyers).  How 
might their contracting behavior respond to such a circumstance? 
One possibility, of course, is that Bianca and Sam will simply wait for 
the uncertainty to resolve itself, and then contract (or not).  Indeed, in some 
circumstances such a response would probably be perfectly sensible.72  At 
the same time, however, waiting may not always be prudent or convenient.  
In many corporate deals, for example, a number of processes must pre-date 
closing, such as regulatory and tax clearance, shareholder approval, due 
diligence, and other forms of miscellaneous planning.  Many of these 
processes can delay the closing of a deal for months and can often take as 
long as one year.  Waiting for the resolution of uncertainty may leave little 
time to reconvene at the bargaining table, structure the deal, accelerate these 
processes, and close.  In contexts where the ex ante likelihood of uncertainty 
is low, waiting can be prohibitively costly. 
Consequently, there may be some situations where ambiguity-averse 
parties prefer to contract straight away, but to make their contract contingent 
on the non-occurrence of significant uncertainty post-execution—at least for 
some period of time before the parties lose the ability to seek viable outside 
options.  Suppose, then, that Sam and Bianca included an express condition 
in their contract that made enforceability contingent on later information 
revealing that they have stayed within the realm of risk (c = 0%).  If in 
contrast, it is discovered that conditions have evolved towards uncertainty (c 
= 50%), the contract calls for autarky. 
As it turns out, a contract that specifically treated migration into an 
environment as an express condition would fare much better than either 
categorical contracting or categorical autarky.  Figure 4 below illustrates this 
point graphically for the case where the buyer (Bianca) has MEU 
 
                                                                                                             
72The current unavailability of credit, even for senior secured debt and for historically safe 
borrowers, may itself be an artifact of uncertainty in the credit markets.  See Gretchen Morgenson, 
Darkness and Light at GE Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2008, at BU 1 (describing how tight credit 
has affected GE's business model). 
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preferences.73  In the Figure, the solid line represents the total welfare (in 
certainty equivalents) that the optimal uncertainty-contingent contract would 
yield for the parties.  The dotted line represents the welfare that a non-
contingent (but otherwise optimal) contract would yield.74  Except for the 
case where the ex ante likelihood of uncertain conditions is zero, a contract 
with an uncertainty condition would yield strictly larger expected gains than 
would the non-contingent contract.  Furthermore, these gains generally 
increase monotonically as the ex ante likelihood of uncertainty q increases, 
up to (just under) 60%.  When ex ante likelihood of ambiguity crosses this 
threshold, moreover, autarky dominates the non-contingent contract.  Here, 




Figure 4.  Gains from Ambiguity-Contingent Contract 
 
                                                                                                             
73Other permutations of buyer- and seller-side ambiguity aversion are qualitatively similar. 
74In other words, such a contract would prescribe an allocation based on the expected ex 
ante likelihood (q) of being in the maximally uncertain state versus the purely risky one.  Given the 
value of q, this would translate into an ex ante set of prior beliefs ranging along the interval from 
(50% - q/2) to (50% + q/2). 
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F.  Intuitions and Corollaries 
Despite its simplicity, the above example suggests a few core 
intuitions that likely extend to more general environments.  In particular, it 
suggests that in the presence of ambiguity aversion, there are distinct gains 
that the parties perceive from fashioning terms of their contract in a manner 
that accounts for prospective uncertainty surrounding the deal.  An encapsu-
lation of these intuitions for contract drafting, interpretation, and enforce-
ment might go something as follows:  
If the surplus available through contracting remains within the 
domain of well-understood risks, then contracts (and the 
judicial enforcement of them) should be relatively insensitive to 
ambiguity aversion. On the other hand, if (1) conditions may 
plausibly transition into a domain of uncertainty, and (2) either 
party is ambiguity averse, then contract terms (and the judicial 
enforcement thereof) should explicitly account for the possi-
bility of uncertainty.  In severe cases of realized ambiguity, it 
may be optimal for contractual duties to be excused altogether. 
Although ambiguity aversion does not categorically prescribe contract 
avoidance in the face of uncertainty, it at least pushes in that direction (with 
varying degrees of strength).  Consequently, if contracting parties are ambi-
guity averse, those preferences should be reflected in the terms of their deals 
(such as MAC/MAE provisions).  This observation, in turn, provides a test-
able implication of ambiguity aversion in contractual settings: as the 
prospects for uncertainty increase, the breadth and scope of express con-
ditions within the contract should expand as well.  I shall return to this pre-
diction below in Part IV. 
Before moving on, however, it may be worth pausing to consider how 
courts (as opposed to the parties) might attempt to make use of the argu-
ments above.  Indeed, even if the parties themselves have the intent to 
condition their duties on the absence of uncertainty, that intent is irrelevant if 
judicial actors are impervious to that fact.  To be sure, judges frequently may 
not have the expertise to divine either when uncertainty is present or whether 
the parties genuinely care about it.  There may be, however, some interpre-
tive rules of thumb that courts can embrace when undertaking this task.  I 
offer a few of them below. 
The first corollary concerns how aggressive a stance courts should 
take a priori in determining ambiguity to be a significant issue.  As noted 
above, the value of ambiguity-contingent contracts (or default rules) lies in 
their ability to address situations where prospective uncertainty is tangibly 
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present in a contractual setting.  Such factors may be difficult for adju-
dicators to observe directly in garden variety contact disputes.  In the 
absence of direct observation, however, it is probably sensible for courts to 
start with a presumption that ambiguity is not a substantial problem.  First, 
the very fact the parties executed a contract may itself reveal their belief that 
the danger of ambiguity with respect to contractual gains was low.  This 
inference likely grows to the extent that the parties failed to include an 
express contractual provision—such as a MAC/MAE term—signaling a 
desire to alter or excuse performance in uncertain environments.75  Further 
still, to the extent that the parties interact in arenas where they have 
considerable expertise and familiarity, the effects of ambiguity are likely to 
be of second order importance.  Finally, even if one is confident that the con-
tractual surplus has become compromised by ambiguity, the parties' options 
outside contracting may be similarly compromised.  Allowing a party to void 
the deal may do more harm than good.  As a practical matter, then, absent a 
clear indication otherwise, it probably makes sense for courts to have a 
presumption against conditioning contractual duties on realized uncertainty. 
Although this reasoning argues in the direction of judicial conser-
vatism, it may only be a weak form of conservatism.  There is a potential 
epistemic circularity between the parties' contractual choices on the one hand 
and their revealed judicial expectations on the other.  Suppose at the time of 
contracting that a buyer and seller anticipated that the danger of prospective 
ambiguity within the contract was large.  The parties might nonetheless exe-
cute the contract with few express provisions accounting for prospective 
ambiguity, anticipating that a court would subsequently accommodate them 
should such contingencies materialize.  In this circumstance, a court would 
be mistaken were it to conclude that the parties' prior contractual conduct 
evinces their indifference towards ambiguity.  On the other hand, this circu-
larity problem is not completely fatal.  If even modest transaction costs 
attend the execution of a contract, at least those parties for whom prospective 
ambiguity is overwhelmingly likely to gain little over autarky would not 
likely enter a contract.  Thus, the court can probably rule out at least those 
circumstances where uncertainty is extremely likely (although perhaps only 
those cases) simply because the parties bothered to execute a contract.76  All 
told, this reasoning appears to counsel for a form of weak conservatism:77 
 
                                                                                                             
75For a similar point, see Triantis, supra note 24, at 464, 466, who explains that "an omitted 
risk . . . is in a sense contemplated and managed at a broader level." 
76Note that the absence of an express condition, in contrast, probably has an even weaker 
inferential value for courts as an interpretive guide.  Indeed, conditionally contracting some set of 
rationalizable conjectures about the background rule could almost always justify the omission of an 
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Corollary 1: Weak Conservatism Principle.  Courts should be 
conservative about finding ambiguity to be a substantial factor 
within a contract, and in the absence of other evidence should 
adopt a presumption that the danger of ambiguity is negligible. 
In a related fashion, ambiguity aversion delivers predictions about the 
dynamic nature of conditions within an optimal contract.  In particular, as 
contracting parties become more familiar with a particular domain of 
unpredictability, they are likely to begin treating it less like uncertainty and 
more like pure risk.  Consequently, as their comfort with and knowledge 
about various contingencies mature, they are less likely to condition 
performance on the non-occurrence of those contingencies.  Accordingly, 
courts should grow more reticent about granting relief upon the occurrence 
of a contingency that has become more familiar to the contracting parties.  
This reasoning gives rise to a second corollary: 
Corollary 2: Familiarity Principle.  As parties become more 
(less) familiar with the characteristics of an unpredictable 
contingency, they will begin to treat it more (less) as a form of 
risk than of uncertainty.  Consequently, courts should be most 
receptive when excusing claims predicated on the occurrence 
of an event whose characteristics are relatively unfamiliar to 
either party. 
A third principle stems from the fact that judicial actors must rely (at 
least in part) on the parties themselves to provide information about whether 
an important ambiguity contingency has arisen after contract execution.  One 
obvious danger with affording parties such an opportunity is that they will 
use it strategically, as a pretext for undoing value-enhancing risk allocation 
decisions that have not gone in their favor.  In the example from above, for 
instance, it is more credible for Sam or Bianca to seek avoidance when it is 
still unknown to either party whether the business will be a success or 
failure. 
Perhaps a stronger reason to favor early over late asserters is that the 
other party's outside options are likely to wane or become more uncertain as 
the time past execution increases.  Soon after committing to a contract, 
                                                                                                             
express condition (precedent or subsequent) in the contract. 
77The weak conservatism principle is in many ways similar to a nuanced form of the (so-
called) "precautionary principle" in environmental policy.  E.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 37, at 119 
(using the term "Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle"); Gardiner, supra note 38, at 36 
(outlining the basic components of the precautionary principle). 
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alternative counterparties can lose interest, move on to other things, or 
otherwise become less accommodating.  In the above example, recall that the 
parties learned about the existence of ambiguity at a point where both had 
the ability to salvage their outside options.  The longer one waits, the less 
this is likely to be the case, and the attractiveness of allowing excuse shrinks. 
Consequently, there are good reasons to favor those who make early 
assertions of excuse rather than those who wait until a late stage of the game. 
This reasoning is reflected in a third corollary: 
Corollary 3: Early Bird Principle.  Courts should be most re-
ceptive to excuse claims asserted before significant uncertainty 
has been resolved.  Excuses asserted long after the executory 
stage, in contrast, should be treated with skepticism. 
A final corollary concerns the process by which ambiguity associated 
with a contract surplus might emerge.  In the example explored above, 
ambiguity emerged exogenously, independent of the actions of either party.  
In some situations outside of that explored here, however, the ambiguity-
creating event may have been within the control of the party now seeking 
excuse.  In such circumstances, courts should be loathe to allow for excuse, 
given that the parties undoubtedly would have wanted to deter such conduct. 
In more familiar Calabresian terms, one might refer to this reasoning as the 
"low cost ambiguity avoider" principle:78 
Corollary 4: Low Cost Ambiguity Avoider Principle.  Courts 
should be reluctant to grant an excuse if that party could have 
taken reasonable steps to avoid or reduce ambiguity, but failed 
to take such steps.  
IV.  EVIDENCE AND APPLICATIONS 
Although the foregoing discussion has proposed a plausible story 
about how ambiguity aversion can "matter" for contractarian objectives, the 
practical significance of that story has remained unattended.  It remains 
unclear whether ambiguity aversion is an appreciable factor in contractual 
 
                                                                                                             
78Gilson and Schwartz as well as Posner and Rosenfield suggest a similar interpretive 
criterion as well.  Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 19, at 355-56 ("When a buyer attempts to exit by 
invoking a MAC clause, the court should ask whether the event was within the seller's ability to 
affect."); Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 57, at 98 ("[C]ontract discharge should not be allowed 
when the event rendering performance uneconomical was reasonably preventable by either party."). 
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settings, or instead is largely irrelevant or peripheral.  If the latter, then we 
would neither expect contracting parties to expend much effort accounting 
for it, nor would we wish courts to alter their behavior in a likewise fashion.  
Addressing this question is important, especially in light of the nature of the 
contracts that motivate this article (acquisition agreements among 
sophisticated parties). 
The enhanced attention that ambiguity aversion has garnered recently 
in the behavioral finance literature provides at least suggestive evidence that 
uncertainty constitutes an important limit to arbitrage in markets with 
sophisticated participants.79  But it is only anecdotal and circumstantial 
evidence that ambiguity aversion matters for the type of contract design 
issues envisioned here.  In this section, I consider how one might go about 
testing more directly for the relevance of ambient uncertainty in the design of 
express contract terms—specifically MAC/MAE clauses.  Finding pre-
liminary evidence consistent with the ambiguity aversion account, I then 
briefly consider practical applications of the approach in specific legal 
settings. 
A.  MAC/MAE Provisions: An Empirical Test 
Perhaps the best place to examine the claims made above empirically 
is in the very application that motivated this article: the design and 
interpretation of MAC/MAE provisions in corporate acquisitions.  To do so, 
I will make use of a unique data set of 528 recent MAC/MAE provisions 
from mergers and acquisitions deals executed between July 2007 and July 
2008.  A preliminary analysis of these provisions suggests that their 
structures respond to ambiguity in a manner consistent with the predictions 
above.  In other words, the extent of ambient uncertainty appears to "matter" 
in predicting the reach and breadth of a MAC/MAE provision. 
At the onset, it is important to realize that there are many plausible 
reasons parties might craft MAC/MAE provisions in practice, many of 
which need not be related to ambiguity aversion.  As noted in the intro-
duction, for example, Gilson and Schwartz posit that the key rationale for a 
MAC/MAE term is to address seller-side moral hazard; that is, a seller may 
be in a position to make "synergy-specific" investments in enhancing the 
value of the deal before closing.80  A MAC/MAE clause, they argue, gives 
 
                                                                                                             
79See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text. 
80Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 19, at 357. 
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the target an efficient incentive to make those investments when it otherwise 
would be underdeterred.81  (I will return to this thesis below.) 
There may also be other plausible rationales behind MAC/MAE 
terms.  A number of practitioners interviewed for this study, for example, 
suggested that, in addition to concerns about uncertainty, one of the key 
reasons for a MAC/MAE provision is to provide a backdrop for possible 
deal restructuring should market conditions change.  A handful (albeit 
fewer) of practitioners also maintained that such provisions can provide a 
helpful backstop against problems of adverse selection, permitting the buyer 
some added room to exit a deal if it begins to appear that the seller has 
misrepresented its current condition, future prospects, or some other material 
fact. 
Significantly, ambiguity aversion may not only be consistent with 
these alternative motivations for MAC/MAEs, but it may even complement 
them.  This seems particularly likely for the latter two rationales for MAC/ 
MAEs described above.  Indeed, even if a principal reason for a MAC/MAE 
provision is to provide a template for renegotiation, that rationale may be 
perfectly consistent with ambiguity aversion once one considers why a 
restructured deal is desirable to begin with.  In the numerical example above, 
for instance, uncertainty justified autarky in "extreme" cases; but for more 
moderate levels of uncertainty, closing the deal likely remains efficient, 
albeit on restructured terms that are responsive to new information about 
ambiguity.82  Viewed in this sense, information about ambiguity itself may 
provide part of the rationale for restructuring, and the credible triggering of 
the MAC can provide a backdrop against which the parties attempt to seize 
those gains.  Similarly, the presence of asymmetric information by a seller 
may plausibly exacerbate problems with ambiguity aversion.  If a buyer 
knows a seller has significant private information but is unsure about how 
that information is distributed across seller "types," then she may discount 
the value of trade significantly.83 
 
                                                                                                             
81Id. at 332. 
82See supra tbl.2, p. 780. 
83See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 57, at 606 n.139.  The joint occurrence of private 
information and ambiguity aversion, moreover, may intersect meaningfully with the role of MAE/ 
MACs in facilitating restructuring.  If transaction costs from restructuring are high (due, say, to 
asymmetric information), then the background allocation of entitlements can affect bargaining.  
Here, the existence of a MAC (even one whose legal effect is unpredictable) may catalyze bargain-
ing.  See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to 
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1053 (1995) (stating that the "information-forcing 
character of liability rules" has an "efficiency-enhancing effect"); Albert Choi & George Triantis, 
Completing Contracts in the Shadow of Costly Verification, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 526 (2008) 
(concluding that "a costly but noisy signal can play an important role in incentive provision[s]"). 
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Ambiguity aversion may also be consistent with Gilson and 
Schwartz's moral hazard story, but if so, to a more attenuated degree.84  In 
theory, both phenomena may simultaneously motivate the adoption of MAC/ 
MAEs.  And in fact, if there is uncertainty around how best to motivate a 
seller to maintain value in the company before closing, then moral hazard 
concerns may also amplify payoff ambiguity; on the other hand, there may 
also be reasons to believe that the two accounts are not fully parsimonious.  
For example, in cases of severe prospective exogenous uncertainty 
surrounding the gains from trade, ambiguity aversion suggests that the 
incidence and breadth of MAC/MAE provisions should rise.  In those same 
environments, in contrast, the deal-preserving specific investments envision-
ed by Gilson and Schwartz may grow less relatively important (akin to 
planting flowers in one's garden notwithstanding an approaching Category 5 
hurricane).85  In the Gilson and Schwartz framework, the breadth of a MAC/ 
MAE provision should grow in circumstances where the target's moral 
hazard problem is most severe: they posit that high technology targets are 
likely to be a prime example of such a circumstance. 
The raw data I utilize comes from Nixon Peabody LLP's annual 
analysis of MAC clauses, the summary statistics of which are published each 
November.86  Nixon Peabody has been producing this survey for seven 
years,87 and since 2005 its methodology has become sufficiently consistent to 
be usable in empirical investigations.  As illustrated in the left panel of Table 
3,88 the data consists largely of a set of binary variables describing the 
MAC/MAE terms of each deal.  In the 2007-08 report, there were thirteen 
distinct categories of MAC/MAE clauses, including terms that deal with the 
target's financial condition, the seller's or buyer's ability to close the deal, 
benefits contemplated by the agreement, either party's ability to continue to 
operate business immediately after closing, and general prospects of the 
target.  In addition to these MAC/MAE categories, the data also reflects the 
existence and scope of exceptions (or "carve outs") to the MAC/MAE.  
 
                                                                                                             
84Indeed, the sole focus of Gilson and Schwartz's analysis is specific investments, and thus 
both buyer and seller are presumed to be risk- and uncertainty-neutral.  Moreover, Gilson and 
Schwartz do not allow for alternative contract terms (such as earn outs or cancellation fees) to 
allocate risk between the parties—in their theoretical approach (and the predictions it spawns), the 
allocation is accomplished solely through deal price and the MAC.  Gilson & Schwartz , supra note 
19, at 339. 
85See also Mukerji, supra note 58, at 1222-23 (making a similar point that incentives may be 
less important for affecting the worst-case scenario outcomes). 
86NIXON PEABODY LLP, SEVENTH ANNUAL MAC SURVEY (2008), available at http:// 
www.nixonpeabody.com/publications_detail3.asp?ID=2488. 
87See id. at 2. 
88See infra tbls.3, 5, pp. 807-10. 
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Carve outs create categorical nullifications of MAC/MAEs, specifying 
domains over which a material adverse event cannot occur.89  They therefore 
are a limiting factor on the scope and reach of a MAC/MAE provision.  In 
the 2007-08 report, there were thirty-one such exceptions, including a 
change in trading price or trading volume of company's stock, changes in 
interest or exchange rates, war, terrorism, acts of God, political volatility, 
legal change, bankruptcy, and national and international calamities.90  As is 
typical, virtually all of the MAC/MAE provisions were on the buyer side, 
perhaps an implicit nod to the observation that corporate law frequently 
mandates an asymmetric seller-side option to exit, via the Revlon doctrine 
and the statutory requirement of shareholder approval.91 
There are a number of advantages to the Nixon Peabody sample over 
other existing MAC/MAE databases.92  First, although it covers only a 
fraction of deals announced each year, the Nixon Peabody data still samples 
a relatively large swath of cash mergers, stock mergers, asset sales, equity 
sales, and tender offers (skewed somewhat towards larger cash and stock 
deals).  In addition, the data set also contains all combinations of public and 
 
                                                                                                             
89The Hexion case, for example, involved a relatively general MAC/MAE pertaining to the 
"financial condition, business, or results of operations" of Huntsman; but its carve outs excluded 
among other things any "changes in general economic or financial market conditions" that did not 
have a "disproportionate effect on the Company."  Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman 
Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 736 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
90See NIXON PEABODY LLP, supra note 86, at 7-11.  Significantly, the absence of a 
MAC/MAE provision does not necessarily imply the absence of exceptions.  The handful of deals 
that lacked a MAC nevertheless had specific exceptions written into them.  Thus, the variable 
"nomac" enters as a miscellaneous variable in this coding scheme. 
91See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251(c), 271(a) (2001) (stating the terms of shareholder 
approval with respect to mergers, sales, leases and exchanges of assets); Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del 1986).  In some cases, buyers also 
have to obtain shareholder approval, but such constraints are often relatively simple to avoid through 
triangular mergers and asset sales.  In stock deals, publicly traded buyers may have to seek 
shareholder approval to dilute current voting shares by 20% or more.  See NYSE, Inc., Listed 
Company Manual § 312.03(c) (2007), available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/.  Even that 
requirement, however, can be waived in extreme cases if a delay would seriously jeopardize the 
company's viability.  Id. § 312.05; cf. In re Bear Stearns Litig., 870 N.Y.S.2d 709, 723, 731 (Sup. 
Ct. 2008) (dismissing a shareholder complaint against a target who sold lock-up block to an acquirer 
amounting to a 39.5% dilution, and declaring that the court "will not second guess" the board's 
decision). 
In the analysis presented below, I retained the modest number of seller-side MAC/MAE 
provisions, as they tended to attend stock deals.  Excluding them does not appreciably change the 
results, however. 
92Both Gilson and Schwartz and Antonio Macias collected and coded MAC provisions from 
public target acquisitions from before 2005.  Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 19, at 351-53; Antonio 
J. Macias, Risk Allocation and Flexibility in Acquisitions: The Economic Impact of Material-
Adverse-Change (MACs) Clauses 2 (Apr. 17, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1108792. 
2009] ON UNCERTAINTY, AMBIGUITY, AND CONTRACTUAL CONDITIONS 791 
private targets and acquirers.  A third advantage to the data set is that it was 
created by practicing lawyers, and thus both its classificatory scheme and 
actual coding are more likely to reflect the judgment of practitioners who 
negotiate these instruments.  But perhaps most significantly, the time period 
available for study here is particularly interesting because it covers MAC/ 
MAE provisions that were executed commencing in early summer of 2007, 
before the sudden meltdown of the private equity wave, through midsummer 
of 2008.  This is a time span in which significantly greater uncertainty 
entered financial markets. 
A downside of the Nixon Peabody data is that it is largely limited to 
the deal value and the MAC/MAE characteristics of the transactions.  There 
are no additional coded attributes related to the deal,93 firm-level controls, or 
market controls.  Such information is obviously helpful if one is interested in 
how such variables predict the existence and structure of MAC/MAE terms 
within the overall deal.  In order to consider the effects of market conditions 
and firm-specific attributes, I merged the Nixon Peabody sample with deals 
recorded in the Thompson's SDC Platinum M&A database.  SDC is an 
extremely broad database that contains not only information about the 
structure of each deal (its financing, structure, etc.) but also firm-specific 
characteristics of both the buying and selling firms.  (It does not, however, 
include an analysis of MAC terms.)  In areas where the SDC data was 
incomplete or appeared unreliable, I supplemented the data when possible 
with hand-collected information through press reports and SEC filings. 
Table 3 describes the cross sectional attributes of the data set, and how 
it measures the various terms of both MAC/MAE provisions and exceptions 
of the original 528 deals, as well as the 452 records with a successful name-
date match in the SDC data set.  The third panel of the table also displays the 
MAC/MAE characteristics for the 247 matched deals involving public 
targets.  It is the public sellers for which the largest amount of information is 
available. 
Because I am interested in understanding how various factors 
(including a measure of ambient market uncertainty) affect the structure of 
an agreement, it is necessary to have a strategy for evaluating (or "scoring") 
the terms of a deal.  The bottom panels of Table 3 consider a number of 
 
                                                                                                             
93Typical acquisition agreements contain a litany of terms beyond the MAC/MAE and 
pricing terms.  Examples of such terms include cancellation fees, "bring down" clauses, no-shop and 
go-shop clauses, earn outs, asset lockups, topping fees, and voting trust agreements.  Although the 
SDC database, infra tbl.5, pp. 809-10, covers some of these other provisions, its coverage was too 
erratic to be helpful for this study.  In future efforts, I hope to augment this spotty SDC data through 
hand collection. 
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plausible scoring algorithms for the Nixon-Peabody data.  Each score cap-
tures a measure of the extent of MAC/MAE coverage or carve out coverage 
or both.  The MERatio, MEPerc, and MERelCov algorithms are particularly 
worth noting, as they attempt to capture both MAC/MAE terms and carve 
outs.  In each, a larger number of MAC/MAE provisions increases the over-
all score, while a large number of exceptions decreases it.  Because these 
scoring functions are atheoretic, I have no reason to believe that one is better 
than another.  For brevity and concreteness, however, I will focus below on 
MEPerc, which measures the total number of MAC/MAE provisions relative 
to the total number of provisions (MAC/MAEs plus exceptions).  MEPerc is 
a convenient scoring rule, as it is bounded theoretically below by zero and 
above by (approximately) one, thereby facilitating the interpretation of 
coefficients.94 
For those interested in how the Hexion-Huntsman deal compares, the 
last column of Table 3 presents the coding for that transaction (which is one 
of the 528 deals captured in the data set).  Consistent with popular zeit-
geist,95 the Huntsman MAC/MAE provision does appear limited in the 
number of affirmative MAC/MAE provisions granted to the buyer, and its 
scores generally reflect this characterization.  At the same time, however, the 
difference between the Huntsman deal and the remaining sampled popu-
lation falls well short of extreme.  Under each scoring rule, for example, 
Hexion-Huntsman falls within a standard deviation of the mean (and it is 
barely distinguishable from other public targets).96 
In addition to firm-level characteristics, I matched the deals with 
external market data relating to factors that could influence the attractiveness 
of the transaction, through the time value of money, risk environment, and 
ambient uncertainty.  To reflect an economy-wide benchmark for time value, 
I included measures of the risk-free rate of return.  The actual cost of capital 
that firms face, however, is above the risk-free rate, due to the undiversi-
fiable risk that investors may bear.  I therefore also included a number of risk 
 
                                                                                                             
94It also appears to be distributed approximately normally within the sample, which suggests 
that the ordinary/generalized least squares estimation is an appropriate approach.  As a robustness 
check, in unreported regressions I have estimated all the specifications reported below with the other 
two comprehensive scores (MRatio and MECoverage).  Both cases produce qualitatively similar 
results. 
There are undoubtedly countless approaches for scoring these contractual provisions.  The 
scoring approaches offered here represent a first (but almost certainly not a final) stab at the issue. 
95See supra notes 4-15 and accompanying text (describing the Hexion decision and news 
commentary surrounding the deal). 
96Of course, some of the attributes of the deal that made it appear seller-friendly concerned 
non-MAC/MAE provisions.  See DealBook, supra note 13 (analyzing how the deal "leaves little 
room for Hexion to escape [the] transaction"). 
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adjustment factors, including (1) the industry-wide β for the target's industry 
group;97 (2) the market risk premium, defined as the difference between the 
return on the risk-free rate and the return on a value-weighted market 
portfolio; and (3) the cross product of the market risk premium and industry-
wide β.  Because the deals in the data set are generally negotiated during a 
period of weeks leading up to the announcement date, both the risk-free rate 
and the market risk premium are computed using the lagged two-week 
means for each predating the announcement date. 
Finding a good proxy for uncertainty (as separate from time value and 
risk) is more challenging.  There is not, to my knowledge, a consensus 
measure that captures the extent or degree of market uncertainty.  
Nevertheless, one candidate measure of uncertainty that has been quickly 
growing in popularity during the last few years is the CBOE's volatility 
index "VIX," which reflects average implied volatility implied from a 
collection of put and call option markets.  VIX is often known as the "fear 
index," and is described by the business press as a reflection of investors' 
sense of unease due to the uncertainty present in the market.98  The value of 
VIX generally rises as expected volatility in the market rises.99  As noted 
above,100 whether expected volatility comes from upward market 
movements, downward market movements, or gyrations around a stationary 
point should not matter—at least in theory—for the value of the VIX index.  
However, a number of studies have demonstrated that VIX is systematically 
larger when markets are falling than when they are rising, an observation that 
is not generally predicted by standard expected utility theory.101  Such 
observations are, however, consistent with various accounts of prospect 
theory (including ambiguity aversion).  Relatedly, a number of financial 
economists have begun to use VIX (or a derivative of it) as a basis for 
measuring uncertainty.102  As with the market risk premium, to allow for the 
 
                                                                                                             
97The risk metric β comes from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and reflects the 
risk that a specific financial asset (such as a stock) has relative to a market portfolio.  A low value of 
β (below 1.0) reflects low risk relative to the market, while a high value (above 1.0) reflects greater 
risk.  See MARK GRINBLATT & SHERIDAN TITMAN, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND CORPORATE 
STRATEGY 151-54 (2002) (introducing CAPM and briefly explaining its practical application). 
98See Lauricella & Lucchetti, supra note 49, at C1. 
99Id. 
100See supra notes 50-51 (explaining why the value of the VIX index shifts). 
101E.g., Hibbert et al., supra note 50, at 2256; Low, supra note 50, at 544 ("I find that this 
metric of risk perception tends to increase when downside volatility increases more than upside 
volatility."). 
102E.g., Bollerslev et al., supra note 51, at 16; Drechsler & Yaron, supra note 51, at 1.  VIX 
may not reflect solely ambiguity and may have risk perceptions embedded within it as well.  Thus, 
some caution is warranted in interpreting the extent to which VIX appears to predict deal structure.  
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time to negotiate a deal, I recorded the lagged two-week means of VIX 
closing values leading up to each deal's announcement date. 
As a preliminary matter, Gilson and Schwartz posit that their moral 
hazard story is most salient in areas where unobservable investments by 
targets in "deal synergies" are important.103  In particular, high technology 
industries represent an area that is susceptible to this phenomenon, and thus 
we should expect more MAC/MAE coverage related to investment-specific 
risk.104  Table 4 compares high technology to other firms, along various 
measures of MAC/MAE and exclusion breadth.  High tech deals appear, on 
the whole, to be quite comparable to other firms in the number of MAC/ 
MAE provisions they include, yet they have nearly 1.3 more carve outs.  In 
terms of the scoring algorithms described above, the additional number of 
carve outs is reflected in slightly narrower overall MAC/MAE breadth, 
though this difference is statistically significant in only one of the three 
measures (MERelCov).  As an initial matter, MAC/MAE provisions in high 
technology deals appear to be mildly narrower than those in other deals, 
which runs contrary to the Gilson and Schwartz account (albeit weakly). 
 




N=452; standard error in brackets; *significant at 5%; **significant at 1% 
 
At the same time, one must be cautious about making inferences about 
high tech deals generally (or the moral hazard argument specifically) without 
                                                                                                             
Consequently, I have also included a number of conventional measures of risk (and given that VIX 
is not conventionally viewed as one of them). In addition, I have also rerun the analysis (with 
consistent results) using alternative derivatives of VIX. 
103Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 19, at 357. 
104Id. at 354-55. 
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attempting to control for other variables of interest.  Many factors (including 
ambiguity and uncertainty) may also play a unique role in industries like 
technology, where a significant component of firm value comes from 
intangible rather than tangible assets.105  Attempting to correct for this unob-
served variable bias requires—at the very least—the inclusion of additional 
controls, a task to which I attend below. 
Two aspects of each deal are broadly observable in the data: (1) the 
total deal value, and (2) the MAC/MAE scores.  It is important to keep in 
mind that just as with the numerical example from Part III, price and non-
price terms are determined simultaneously, as a by-product of negotiation.  
Consequently, it would be inappropriate to include deal price or premium as 
a right hand side variable in predicting the intensity of a MAC/MAE 
provision.  Nor, for that matter, would it be desirable simply to ignore the 
information on deal value, since shocks that affect price would likely also 
affect non-price terms and vice versa.  Thus, my empirical strategy in what 
follows is to estimate price and MAC/MAE score regressions jointly, using a 
seemingly unrelated regressions approach.106 
Table 5107 contains selected results from the full collection of matched 
deals involving both public and private acquirers and targets.  Each panel of 
the table reflects jointly estimated coefficients for (1) the deal value (logged), 
and (2) the score associated with the MAC/MAE terms (captured by 
MEPerc).  There is limited data coverage of firm-specific control variables 
for private companies beyond the basic deal terms, a fact reflected by the 
relatively modest number of controls and goodness for the regressions in the 
table.  Nevertheless, at least for the larger specifications, both the price and 
non-price estimations generate coefficients that are jointly significant at the 
0.01 level or better. 
Recall from the earlier analysis of ambiguity aversion in Part II that 
uncertainty will have an ambiguous effect on price, but a positive predicted 
effect on the attractiveness (and thus breadth) of a MAC.  Interpreting VIX 
 
                                                                                                             
105Even Gilson and Schwartz themselves subdivide among high tech deals.  Given that my 
primary question of inquiry is whether there is evidence of ambiguity aversion in deals, rerunning 
the entirety of Gilson & Scwhartz's results for a later time period here is only of secondary interest. 
106See Arnold Zellner, An Efficient Method of Estimating Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Equations and Tests for Aggregation Bias, 57 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 348, 349-52 (1962) (establishing 
an estimation procedure that uses "seemingly unrelated regression equations"). 
107See infra tbl.5, pp. 809-10.  The alert reader will note that simultaneous estimation of both 
the price and the MAC/MAE specifications is not necessary if one uses the same controls in each.  
See infra pp. 809-10.  If one uses different right hand side variables between two expressions, 
however, SUR is appropriate.  In unreported regressions (available from author), I have checked the 
robustness of these results to non-symmetric specifications, and for which a SUR specification 
provides a clearer efficiency advantage.  The results appear robust. 
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as a measure of uncertainty, this prediction appears to be born out.  
Specifically, VIX has a consistently positive and statistically significant 
predictive effect on the MAC/MAE score.  Although the practical 
significance of the coefficient's size may appear small on first blush, 
corrected for their respective ranges, a 1.0 standard deviation increase in 
VIX would predict an approximate 0.35 standard deviation increase in the 
MAC/MAE score.  This corresponds to an appreciable (though not over-
powering) degree of economic significance.  In comparison, VIX has a 
statistically insignificant predictive effect on logged deal value (trivially 
consistent with the predictions of ambiguity aversion). 
In contrast to the estimated VIX coefficients, more conventional risk 
measures—and particularly β—appear to play a much different predictive 
role.  Higher values of β predict a lower deal value (albeit with sporadic 
statistical significance), and virtually no effect on MAC/MAE structure.  
One plausible interpretation of this finding is that fluctuations in risk tend to 
be reflected in price terms (if at all), while fluctuations in uncertainty tend to 
be reflected in non-price terms, such as MAC/MAE structure. 
A few other features of these regressions are worth noting.  First, 
strategic buyers appear on average to pay less than financial buyers and 
demand slightly broader MAC/MAE terms (though the latter effect is not 
statistically significant).  In addition, the accounting value of the acquirer 
(one of the few financial variables broadly represented across SDC matched 
deals) predicts a higher deal value and no discernible effect on MACs.  This 
possibly reflects both the fact that larger acquirers are better organizational 
matches for larger targets, as well as the possibility that larger acquirers are 
less likely to be risk averse.  Acquisitions of public targets by private buyers 
(principally private equity deals) are more likely to have both higher deal 
values and narrower MAC/MAEs relative to any other public-private 
dyad.108 
Finally, after controlling for other factors, there appear to be few 
differences in MAC/MAE when the target is a high technology firm.  In fact, 
in this set of regressions, a high tech target appears to predict a lower 
 
                                                                                                             
108If reduced investor diversification within private buyers is a proxy for greater organi-
zational risk and ambiguity aversion, this effect seems inconsistent with both a risk- and uncertainty-
based account of MAC/MAE provisions.  On the other hand, financing of these deals is still often 
syndicated more broadly, and the acquirers may immediately realize significant and immediate 
upside benefits (e.g., elimination of agency costs, deregistration, etc.).  Moreover, since incumbent 
management frequently works with private equity investors, the attributes of the firm may already be 
familiar to the acquirer, dampening the effects of ambiguity aversion.  It bears noting that most of 
the deals in this dyad reflect cash acquisitions, and thus the pressure to close quickly may reduce the 
need for a broad MAC/MAE. 
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MAC/MAE score.109  Compared to Table 4,110 then, the possibly distinct 
structure of tech deals dampen considerably when one controls for other 
possible factors (including market uncertainty).  One possible reason for the 
reduced evident power of the Gilson and Schwartz story111 is that the sample 
of MAC/MAE provisions they study comes from announced public 
acquisitions in 1993, 1995, and 2000, a period of significant market 
advances.  The data studied here, in contrast, correspond with a period of 
notable market declines.  Within behavioral finance, ambiguity aversion has 
been found to be more prevalent during market downturns than during 
booms—an observation that suggests the relative importance of ambiguity 
aversion may be counter-cyclical.112 
The sparsity of controls in Table 5 may give some cause for concern, 
suggesting that it may be fruitful to repeat the above exercise with public 
targets only, for which more firm-specific controls are available.  Table 6113 
reports on the results of this narrower—but deeper—inquiry, adding controls 
that include the target's pre-bid equity value (logged), the target's total assets 
(logged), the targets total liabilities (logged), the target's four-week return on 
equity, and the target's and acquirer's earnings per share. 
Note that limiting the inquiry to public targets immediately reduces 
the usable sample size by around 50% while adding a number of control 
variables, a combined effect that can reduce precision of the estimated 
coefficients.  Nevertheless, even with this reduction in usable data, the 
overall explanatory power of regression specifications in Table 6 jumps 
considerably from Table 5.  Both the pricing and MAC score coefficients are 
jointly significant at either the 5% or the 1% levels across all specifications, 
and a number of financial asset and income variables have significant 
explanatory power. 
More to the point for the instant inquiry, the estimated coefficients on 
VIX remain quite solid and consistent, barely changing from Table 5.  In all 
specifications, the VIX coefficient is statistically significant at either the 5% 
or the 1% level.  In addition, the economic magnitudes of the estimated VIX 
coefficients are, if anything, larger than they were in Table 5.  Also 
consistent with the previous iteration, the key measure for transaction risk, 
 
                                                                                                             
109This finding is robust to the score used, including MERelCov, where tech deals appeared 
to have the strongest measurable difference. 
110See supra tbl.4, p. 794. 
111Ultimately, this remains a question that admits considerable speculation, and is the target 
of future research.  See generally Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 19. 
112See Barberis & Thaler, supra note 44, at 1074-75 (stating that ambiguity aversion is 
accentuated in moments where a decision maker feels incompetent). 
113See infra tbl.6, pp. 811-12. 
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average target-industry β, generally tends—all else constant—to predict 
lower values but not the breadth of MAC/MAE provisions. 
As before, private acquirers of public targets tend to pay more (con-
trolling for target-level variables) than do public acquirers.  However, there 
does not appear to be a statistically significant difference between public and 
private purchasers in their proclivity to execute broad or narrow MAC/MAE 
provisions. 
One potential cause for both Tables 4 and 5 is that the proxy I use for 
ambiguity, VIX, possibly reflects both risk and ambiguity factors, thereby 
possibly causing me to overattribute the effects of ambiguity.  Note that both 
the above specifications attempt to address this issue indirectly, by including 
other more conventional risk proxies (such as industry β and market risk 
premium).  However, as one additional robustness check, I reran all of the 
analyses in Table 1 using the "variance risk premium," a transformation of 
VIX, which consists of the difference between VIX and the realized forward 
volatility realized by the reference assets.  This alternative measure has been 
advocated in other studies for representing ambiguity.114  Although some of 
the results weaken slightly in some specifications, others actually become 
stronger.  On the whole, then, this robustness test appears to give roughly 
analogous results. 
The inclusion of target-level financial control variables (such as assets 
and liabilities) in specifications [3]-[5] also appears to have explanatory 
power in predicting the deal value.  Somewhat curiously, in specifications 
[3] and [4], total target liabilities appear to have a positive predictive effect 
on value.  Total assets, in contrast, appear to enter negatively and with paltry 
statistical significance.  These observations appear curious at first blush (e.g., 
suggesting that companies with greater debt relative to equity should 
command a higher price).  A means for resolving this curiosity is to note that 
each of the first four specifications in Table 6 also include a control for the 
pre-announcement equity value of the target, which itself is likely 
endogenous to other right hand side variables and may in particular reflect 
public investors' assessment of the target's acquisition value.  Moreover, it 
may be that part of the economic gains from the transaction (particularly 
private equity deals) come from the inability of targets to realize the tax 
advantages of leverage and the view (at least from the acquirer's perspective) 
that the target's existing debt load was overly penalized by public investors.  
When one drops pre-announcement equity value from the joint regressions 
 
                                                                                                             
114See supra note 51.  In the interests of space, and given their general similarity, I have not 
reported these robustness tests here. 
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(specification [5]), the total assets coefficient in the price equation becomes 
strongly positive, and the total liabilities coefficient becomes strongly 
negative,115 as a priori intuition would suggest.  Greater target-level assets 
pre-dict narrower MAC coverage and a smaller score, while greater 
liabilities predict a larger score.  While this observation is likely consistent 
with ambiguity aversion, it is also consistent with other theories.116 
Finally, whether a deal involves a high tech target is not terribly pre-
dictive of MAC/MAE structure.  Across the specifications in Table 6, tech 
deals manifest effects that are mildly positive in sign but uniformly 
insignificant statistically.117  Thus, the public target deals from 2007 to 2008 
also do not appear (at least in the aggregate) to provide strong support for the 
moral hazard thesis of Gilson and Schwartz.118  It may be that both the 
adverse selection and ambiguity stories have explanatory power, but that in 
the last year the former account has been of first order importance.  If so, 
then the systematic relationship between uncertainty and MAC/MAE cover-
age may not hold over longer periods of time.  Further investigation may be 
able to test this conjecture.119 
All told, a preliminary empirical assessment of recent MAC/MAE 
structures yields evidence that is consistent with the claim that ambiguity (or 
the prospective anticipation of it) plays a significant role in determining deal 
structure. 
B.  Legal Applications 
The previous sections have argued that ambiguity aversion provides 
both a plausible and empirically supportable account of why contracting 
parties might adopt express conditions of performance (such as MAC/ 
MAEs) and how they might structure them.  In light of these arguments, I 
 
                                                                                                             
115Dropping pre-announcement equity value, in contrast, does not affect the VIX coefficient 
at all. 
116Including common sense: people pay more for things that are likely to be worth more, and 
vice versa. 
117This lack of predictive power is even more pronounced when measured against alternative 
MAC/MAE scores, such as MERelCov. 
118As another robustness check, in unreported regressions (available for author), I interacted 
both the VIX uncertainty measure and the various risk measures with the high tech dummy variable 
and reran the regressions.  There, MAC scores of high tech targets appear even more responsive to 
market uncertainty than other types of firms, and no more sensitive than other firms to target level 
risk measurements.  This finding is also consistent with ambiguity aversion even within (indeed 
particularly within) high tech firms in 2007-08. 
119In future work, I plan to include the entire panel of MAC/MAE provisions from 2005 
through 2008, which may allow for testing longer-term time trends. 
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consider below a few brief applications within "real world" cases.  Ulti-
mately, these applications are tentative, but they nonetheless help to lay out 
how, as a practical matter, my thesis might be fruitful for understanding 
actual disputes.  In the following subsections, therefore, I will first return to 
the Hexion v. Huntsman decision, assessing how the opinion fares through 
the lens of ambiguity-averse contractarianism.  I then briefly consider the 
same exercise in the context of IBP v. Tyson Foods, a well-known pre-
decessor to Hexion.  In both cases, I argue, the analyses offered by the 
Delaware Court of Chancery is consistent with an ambiguity account (as 
defined above), though Hexion more so than IBP. 
1.  Hexion v. Huntsman 
Recall that in Hexion, Vice Chancellor Lamb rejected a pre-trial claim 
that a material adverse event had transpired, and instead required Hexion to 
exercise its best efforts to close the transaction.120  How would his opinion 
fare through the lens of ambiguity aversion?  On first blush, the prospects 
might not look particularly good.  Given the magnitude of uncertainty that 
typified the market by the late spring of 2008, one might argue (with some 
justification) that Lamb was insensitive about how this uncertainty might 
have compromised the likely gains from the deal.  Viewed from this 
perspective, Lamb may have been too quick to conclude that no MAE had 
transpired. 
On the other hand, numerous other factors in this case likely justify its 
outcome, even within the framework of ambiguity aversion.  As noted 
above, the MAC provisions combined with the other terms of the deal made 
for a discernibly unforgiving instrument.  This narrow scope has information 
content about the parties' situation.  Vice Chancellor Lamb's resulting re-
sponse to this signal, in turn, bears some similarity to the principle of Weak 
Conservatism.  Indeed, in the opinion Lamb specifically recognized the 
relatively narrow berth provided Hexion by the terms of the deal, and 
accordingly placed a higher burden for overcoming that presumption.121 
In a related vein, one of the more interesting doctrinal aspects of the 
case involves how the court effectively treated the clause as a condition 
subsequent (notwithstanding the express language in the deal that strongly 
suggested a condition precedent).122  In practice, this distinction is more than 
 
                                                                                                             
120Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 722 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
121Id. at 739-40 (placing "the burden to show the existence of an MAE squarely on 
Hexion"). 
122Id. at 757 ("Huntsman is correct that the solvency of the combined entity is not a 
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rhetorical, since it determines the (often dispositive) question of who bears 
the burden of proof.  For conditions precedent, the non-breaching party must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the nominated condition 
occurred, and only after such an occurrence would the defendant's duty be 
triggered.123  In a condition subsequent, it is the (allegedly) breaching party 
who must prove that the nominated condition occurred, as a means for 
excusing his obligation.124  As Lamb's opinion appears to make clear, absent 
a clear indication from the parties, the linguistic presentation of the 
MAE/MAC will not determine its interpretation: 
 
[MAC/MAEs] are strange animals, sui generis among their 
contract clause brethren.  It is by no means clear to this court 
that the form in which a material adverse effect clause is draft-
ed (i.e., as a representation, or warranty, or a condition to 
closing), absent more specific evidence regarding the intention 
of the parties, should be dispositive on the allocation of the 
burden of proof.  Typically, conditions precedent are easily 
ascertainable objective facts, generally that a party performed 
some particular act or that some independent event has 
occurred.  A material adverse effect clause does not easily fit 
into such a mold, and it is not at all clear that it ought to be 
treated the same for this purpose.  Rather . . . it seems the pref-
erable view, and the one the court adopts, that absent clear 
language to the contrary, the burden of proof with respect to a 
material adverse effect rests on the party seeking to excuse its 
performance under the contract.125 
 
Given the degree to which M&A attorneys obsess over linguistic 
minutiae, Lamb's skepticism about the deterministic nature and plain 
meaning of language is curious (and borderline Traynoresque126).  Never-
theless, while this part of the opinion may offend doctrinal purists, his inter-
pretational presumption may also be consistent with the principle of Weak 
Conservatism.127  As noted above, the relatively seller-friendly terms of the 
                                                                                                             
condition precedent to Hexion's obligations under the merger agreement.") (emphasis added). 
123RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225 cmt. a (1981). 
124Id. 
125Hexion, 965 A.2d at 739 (footnotes omitted). 
126See Pac. Gas & Elec. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644-46, 
(Cal. 1968) (Traynor, C.J.) (reversing the application of the parol evidence rule, and holding "[i]f 
words had absolute and constant referents, it might be possible to discover contractual intention in 
the words themselves and in the manner in which they were arranged.  Words, however, do not have 
absolute and constant referents"). 
127See supra Corollary 1, p. 785. 
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deal were a plausible signal that the parties viewed ambiguity aversion to be 
relatively unimportant ex ante.128  Construed in this way, it economizes on 
judicial resources and litigation costs for the court to place the burden on the 
party who is claiming that the least plausible (ex ante) state has now come to 
pass.  As applied here, then, it makes considerable sense to require the party 
seeking excuse (i.e., Hexion) to demonstrate that the uncertain contingency 
had occurred—the very fabric of a condition subsequent.129 
Two other factors appear further to justify the Hexion outcome.  First, 
as has been noted numerous times (including in Lamb's opinion) Hexion did 
not come forward to attempt to trigger the MAE/MAC clause until nearly a 
year after the deal's announcement.130  Even by the standards of large 
corporate acquisitions, this is very late in the game.  Viewed in this light, the 
Early Bird Principle suggests that Lamb was rightly skeptical of Hexion's 
position, particularly given that they came at a point where Huntsman's 
outside prospects were sufficiently compromised.131  Second, Lamb reserved 
considerable disapprobation for the fact that while Hexion was ostensibly 
under a duty to use best efforts to close the merger, it instead proactively 
attempted to engineer an insolvency opinion in order to trigger the 
MAC/MAE, providing its financial advisor with self-serving (negative) 
projections of potential synergies, and possibly even managing its own 
accounting practices to render that result.132  Given that the seeds of the 
alleged uncertainty about the deal were at least in part sown by Hexion's own 
behavior, the Least Cost Ambiguity Avoider Principle may also support the 
outcome.133 
 
                                                                                                             
128See DealBook, supra note 13, and accompanying text. 
129Another potentially important consideration would involve identifying which party has 
better access to information that would verify or disprove the emergence of the uncertainty 
contingency, and to assign initial presumptions to force that party to come forward.  In many ways, 
this point parallels the famous Prosser/Wigmore debate over res ipsa loquitur doctrine.  
See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 302 (1941) (characterizing res ipsa 
loquitor as an "inference of negligence" that a fact-finder is "permitted but not compelled to 
accept"); JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE 
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 397 (3d ed. 1940) (stating that res ipsa loquitor does not "ask[] the 
Court to perform a process of inference"—rather, it "proves or disproves itself"). 
The Hexion case does not seem clear cut in either direction; however, it seems at least 
plausible that a strategic buyer (like Hexion) may have better information about the nature and 
predictability of synergistic gains. 
130See Hexion, 965 A.2d at 723.  The parties signed the agreement on July 12, 2007; the 
plaintiffs filed suit on June 18, 2008.  Id. 
131See supra Corollary 3, p. 786. 
132Hexion, 965 A.2d at 751-54. 
133See supra Corollary 4, p.786. 
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2.  IBP Inc. v. Tyson Foods 
The Hexion case is but a recent shot in a decade-long volley of 
MAC/MAE jurisprudence.  Interestingly, no Delaware case to date has actu-
ally found a MAE to have occurred.134  The doctrinal pedigree of these 
cases, while perhaps modest by comparative standards, contains a number of 
notable entries, perhaps none more so than In re IBP Inc. Shareholders Liti-
gation,135 which involved a 2000 merger agreement that was the by-product 
of an auction for control of IBP between Tyson Foods (the ultimate winner) 
and a management buyout group.  Unlike in Hexion, the merger agreement 
contained a MAC/MAE that was notable in its breadth, containing few of the 
exceptions that typify many similarly situated deals.136  Months after the deal 
was announced, IBP began to experience poor earnings (due to a combina-
tion of an impairment to a subsidiary and cyclical revenue downturns).137  
Tyson then sought to trigger the MAC/MAE provision to excuse perform-
ance.138 
Using conventional contract interpretation doctrines (though applying 
New York law), Vice Chancellor Strine found the MAC had not been 
triggered, on what was self-described as a "close" call.139  One of the more 
controversial aspects of Strine's opinion was that it narrowed the scope of the 
MAC/MAE beyond its apparently broad text, holding that "a buyer ought to 
have to make a strong showing to invoke a Material Adverse Effect excep-
tion to its obligation to close."140  To make such a showing, Strine held, a 
buyer would have to demonstrate the occurrence of a significant event that 
could not have been easily foreseen at the time of contracting: 
 
 
                                                                                                             
134Given the nature of settlement, this is not necessarily dispositive about the non-receptivity 
of Delaware courts to MAC/MAE provisions.  In late 2007, for instance, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & 
Co. (KKR) and Goldman Sachs invoked an MAE clause to escape an $8 billion buyout of Harman 
International.  The case did not go to litigation, but resulted in a settlement whereby the parties 
terminated the acquisition, replacing it with a much smaller private debt placement.  Dana Cimilluca 
& Dennis K. Berman, KKR, Goldman Cancel $8 Billion Harman Deal, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 
2007, at A3. 
135789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001).  Other well known entries include; S.C. Johnson & Son, 
Inc. v. Dowbrands, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 657, 670-71 (D. Del. 2001) (considering a claim related to 
an MAE clause, among others); Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., No. 20,502, 2005 WL 1039027 
(Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005), reprinted in 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 993 (2005). 
136IBP, 789 A.2d at 68. 
137Id. at 22-23. 
138Id. at 23. 
139Id. at 68 ("[T]he question of whether IBP has suffered a Material Adverse Effect remains 
a close one."). 
140IBP, 789 A.2d at 68. 
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[E]ven where a Material Adverse Effect condition is as broadly 
written as the one [here], that provision is best read as a back-
stop protecting the acquiror from the occurrence of unknown 
events that substantially threaten the overall earnings potential 
of the target in a durationally-significant manner.  A short-term 
hiccup in earnings should not suffice; rather the Material 
Adverse Effect should be material when viewed from the 
longer-term perspective of a reasonable acquiror.141 
 
Ultimately, after admitting to considerable ambivalence about the 
case, Strine found that Tyson failed to make this showing.142  The court then 
(again somewhat surprisingly) granted a specific performance remedy, and 
the deal closed a few months later (on altered terms).143 
Viewed through the lens of ambiguity aversion, Strine's opinion in 
IBP is also somewhat of a close call.  In interpreting the MAE, the court both 
narrowed its reach and imposed the burden of demonstrating its occurrence 
on Tyson.  Given the evident breadth of the MAE's language, both of these 
moves are curious and do not seamlessly follow from the principle of Weak 
Conservatism.  Unlike the terms of the Hexion deal, IBP involved a broad, 
open-ended MAE that plausibly signaled the parties' intent for the MAE 
trigger to be relatively sensitive.144  By narrowing the scope of this term, the 
court effectively disregarded this signal. 
At the same time, other parts of the opinion provide a few potential 
avenues for reconciliation.  For example, Strine placed significant weight on 
the fact that Tyson's statements and actions showed that it had long been 
aware of the problems in one of IPB's subsidiaries.145  In fact, most analysts 
and even Tyson's own financial advisor still considered the terms of the deal 
to be fair.146  The fact that IBP's performance had been comparable to its 
track record (though barely so) suggests, consistent with the Principle of 
 
                                                                                                             
141Id. (footnotes omitted). 
142Id. at 71. 
143See id. at 84.  Interestingly, Yair Listoken detected positive abnormal returns for both IBP 
and Tyson upon the release of Strine's opinion.  Yair Jason Listokin, The Empirical Case for Spe-
cific Performance: Evidence from the Tyson-IBP Litigation (Working Paper, Mar. 1, 2005), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=679874. 
144Compare Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 724 (Del. 
Ch. 2008) (describing the MAE clause as "narrowly tailored"), with IBP, 789 A.2d at 65-66 
("Although many merger contracts contain specific exclusions from MAE clauses . . . [this clause] is 
unqualified by such express exclusions."). 
145IBP, 789 A.2d at 22 ("During the auction process, Tyson was given a great deal of 
information that suggested that IBP was heading into a trough in the beef business."). 
146Id. at 72. 
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Familiarity, that the parties may not have entered a realm of uncertainty that 
was significant enough to be reflected in the company's performance. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Using MAC/MAE provisions as an animating template, this article has 
argued that the behavioral economics concept of "ambiguity aversion" is a 
helpful device for understanding contractual conditions and excuses.  I have 
argued that if one or more parties is ambiguity averse, and if the surplus 
from contracting is subject to uncertainty, then the terms of the resulting 
agreement (as well as the law's interpretation of them) should reflect those 
preferences.  In cases where prospective ambiguity is particularly severe, an 
optimal contract/interpretive scheme could allow the contract to be voided 
entirely, reimposing autarky. 
In addition to arguing for the plausibility of this account, I have 
endeavored to test it empirically.  Using data from acquisition agreements 
announced between 2007 and 2008, I found that the breadth and reach of 
MAE clauses appear consistently responsive to a measure of "ambient" 
market uncertainty during negotiations.  This effect persists, moreover, when 
one controls for risk attributes, industry effects, acquirer characteristics, and 
financial control variables.  Evidently, at least in the most recent crop of 
merger agreements, ambiguity "matters" for contract design.  The way that it 
may matter, in turn, provides insights about recent cases that have attempted 
to interpret MAE clauses. 
Though I have not endeavored to explore them here, the intuitions 
developed above may also have applications to other domains within 
contract law.  One such domain might be the set of doctrines associated with 
implied conditions, such as mutual mistake.  For instance, Andrew Kull  
reports that the most predictive element of outcome of a mistake case is 
whether the contract at issue was still executory or substantially perform-
ed.147  Courts appear much more willing to void executory agreements based 
upon a mistake than they are to rescind fully performed agreements, regard-
less of whether the formal elements of mutual mistake appear present.148  
While generally considered to be a curiosity, Kull's finding is actually 
consistent with the Early Bird Principle noted above, in which excuse claims 
are more likely to be credible products of realized ambiguity (and less likely 
to be strategic) if made early on after execution rather than late in the game.  
 
                                                                                                             
147Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract Remedies, 43 
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 10-11 (1991). 
148Id. at 11. 
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Another area for extension might be in corporate law and the design of 
Revlon auctions.  When a seller's shareholders are ambiguity averse, the 
optimal design may turn critically on the extent to which the distribution of 
buyer values is itself subject to ambiguity.  In contexts of extreme uncer-
tainty, a proverbial "bird in the hand" (i.e., a reliable initial bidder) may be 
substantially more valuable than two (or more) in the bush.  Accordingly, 
deal lockups that are ordinarily viewed with suspicion (such as no-shops, 
poison pill protections, large cancellation fees, and topping fees) may be 
more acceptable in such contexts.149  I leave these questions (and potentially 
others) for another day.  
The constructive thesis offered here is meant to be neither exclusive 
nor dismissive of alternative accounts of express or implied conditions.  To 
the contrary, there are undoubtedly many reasons that parties include force 
majeure provisions in their contracts, some of which are perfectly consistent 
with (and even complementary to) ambiguity aversion.  At the same time, 
however, within the current financial climate, one can reasonably expect that 
the challenge of allocating uncertainty will increasingly come to confront 
courts, practitioners, and legal scholars.  Developing an appreciation for such 
challenges, as well as the analytical tools for addressing them, is an 
investment whose return is significant, practically relevant, and (hopefully) 
unambiguous. 
 
                                                                                                             
149A recent New York case involving the Bear Stearns rescue arguably demonstrates this sort 
of reasoning.  In it, the court dismissed a shareholder complaint stating that the Bear board 
impermissibly sold JP Morgan a 39.5% dilutive stake in new shares without first obtaining a 
shareholder vote (as would ordinarily be required under NYSE rules).  In re Bear Stearns Litig., 870 
N.Y.S.2d 709, 730 (Sup. Ct. 2008).  The court invoked a little used exception to the rules and 
implicitly signaled a lighter touch in judging the board's actions in a time of uncertainty:  
In response to a sudden and rapidly-escalating liquidity crisis, Bear Stearns' 
directors acted expeditiously to consider the company's limited options.  They 
attempted to salvage some $1.5 billion in shareholder value and averted a 
bankruptcy that may have returned nothing to the Bear Stearns' shareholders, while 
wreaking havoc on the  financial markets.  The Court should not, and will not, 
second guess their decision. 
Id. at 731 (footnote omitted). 
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APPENDIX 
Table 3.  Summary Statistics of MAC/MAE Provision 
 
Category Variable Description of Variable 










MAC on the business, operations, financial condition, etc. 
MAC on Seller's ability to close the deal 
MAC on Purchaser's ability to close the deal 
Losses over a specified threshold deemed to be a MAC 
MAC on the benefits contemplated by the agreement 
Ability of Purchaser to continue to operate business immediately after closing in substantially 









Ability of Target to continue to operate business immediately after closing in substantially 
same manner as immediately before closing 
MAC on prospects of the Company/Target 
MAC on the securities or purchased assets 
MAC on the validity or enforceability of agreement 
Reasonable expectation of event to have a material adverse effect/change 
MAC out with no definition of "MAE" or "MAC" 
Disproportionate Effects Language 









Change in economy or business in general 
Change in general conditions of the specific industry 
Change in securities markets 
Change in trading price or trading volume of Company's stock 
Change in interests rates 







Acts of war or major hostilities 
Acts of terrorism 
Acts of God 
Change in political conditions 
National calamity 







Change in laws or regulations 
Change in interpretation of laws by courts or government entities 
Change in resulting from bankruptcy or actions of a bankruptcy court 
Change in applicable taxes/tax law 








Change in Target's relationship with any labor organization/unions 
Reduction of customers or decline in business 
Commencement of a proceeding in bankruptcy of a material customer 
Adverse effect resulting in seasonal reduction in revenues 
Delay or cancellation of orders for service or products 









Effects of announcement of transaction 
Expenses incurred in connection with transaction 
Changes caused by the taking of any action required or permitted or in any way resulting 
from or arising in connection with the agreement 
Changes in GAAP 
Failure by the Target to meet revenue or earnings projections 
Any action required to be taken under law or contract by which Target is bound 












Total number of MAC/MAE terms 
Total number of MAC/MAE Exclusions 
Quasi-ratio of MAC/NAE terms to exclusions = totmac/(totexc + 1) 
Quasi-percentage of total MAC/MAE provisions to total of all provisions = totmac / (totmac 
+ totexc + 1) 
Total MACs relative to total coded = totmac / (total # MAC categories) 
Total exceptions relative to total coded = totexc / (total # Exclusions categories) 
Relative coverage of MAC/MAE terms to exceptions = MCoverage – Ecoverage 
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Table 3.  Summary Statistics of MAC/MAE Provision (continued) 
 
All Deals (N=528) 
Mean   SD   Min   Max 
SDC Matches (N=452) 
Mean   SD   Min   Max 
Pub. Tar. Matches (N==247) 
Mean   SD   Min   Max 
H-H 
1,460   2,960   100   27,300 1,420   2,600   100   23,000 1,960   3,160   102   23,000 9,910 
88.26%   -          0        1 
44.13%   -          0        1 
23.48%   -          0        1 
3.22%     -          0        1 
0.95%     -          0        1 
0.95%     -          0        1 
91.59%   -          0        1 
48.45%   -          0        1 
24.56%   -          0        1 
3.10%     -          0        1 
0.88%     -          0        1 
0.44%     -          0        1 
95.14%   -          0        1 
54.66%   -          0        1 
23.48%   -          0        1 
1.62%     -          0        1 
0.81%     -          0        1 








0.76%     -          0        1 
 
3.22%     -          0        1 
23.11%   -          0        1 
2.08%     -          0        1 
15.34%   -          0        1 
7.01%     -          0        1 
51.14%   -          0        1    
0.88%     -          0        1 
 
2.88%     -          0        1 
25.00%   -          0        1 
2.65%     -          0        1 
15.04%   -          0        1 
5.53%     -          0        1 
53.98%   -          0        1 
1.62%     -          0        1 
 
2.02%     -          0        1 
24.29%   -          0        1 
2.02%     -          0        1 
13.36%   -          0        1 
3.64%     -          0        1 









3.79%     -          0        1 3.54%     -          0        1 4.45%     -          0        1 0 
75.38%   -          0        1 
69.51%   -          0        1 
44.89%   -          0        1 
33.14%   -          0        1 
15.91%   -          0        1 
11.74%   -          0        1 
77.88%   -          0        1 
72.57%   -          0        1 
44.25%   -          0        1 
37.61%   -          0        1 
15.93%   -          0        1 
10.62%   -          0        1 
82.19%   -          0        1 
76.11%   -          0        1 
47.77%   -          0        1 
57.49%   -          0        1 
20.24%   -          0        1 







60.04%   -          0        1 
59.47%   -          0        1 
24.81%   -          0        1 
37.69%   -          0        1 
12.31%   -          0        1 
7.39%     -          0        1 
64.38%   -          0        1 
64.60%   -          0        1 
26.33%   -          0        1 
40.93%   -          0        1 
13.50%   -          0        1 
8.19%     -          0        1 
70.04%   -          0        1 
70.45%   -          0        1 
31.98%   -          0        1 
44.94%   -          0        1 
11.34%   -          0        1 







62.88%   -          0        1 
27.46%   -          0        1 
3.22%     -          0        1 
3.41%     -          0        1 
12.50%   -          0        1 
1.14%     -          0        1 
68.36%   -          0        1 
31.19%   -          0        1 
2.88%     -          0        1 
3.10%     -          0        1 
12.61%   -          0        1 
1.33%     -          0        1 
75.30%   -          0        1 
36.44%   -          0        1 
2.43%     -          0        1 
3.64%     -          0        1 
14.57%   -          0        1 







0.76%     -          0        1 
10.98%   -          0        1 
0.38%     -          0        1 
2.27%     -          0        1 
3.22%     -          0        1 
4.92%     -          0        1 
0.88%     -          0        1 
13.05%   -          0        1 
0.44%     -          0        1 
4.20%     -          0        1 
2.65%     -          0        1 
5.31%     -          0        1 
0.81%     -          0        1 
17.00%   -          0        1 
0.40%     -          0        1 
4.86%     -          0        1 
2.02%     -          0        1 







63.83%   -          0        1 
5.11%     -          0        1 
55.87%   -          0        1 
 
60.04%   -          0        1 
35.04%   -          0        1 
6.63%     -          0        1 
14.96%   -          0        1 
65.04%   -          0        1 
5.31%     -          0        1 
59.96%   -          0        1 
 
64.82%   -          0        1 
39.16%   -          0        1 
7.74%     -          0        1 
18.36%   -          0        1 
70.04%   -          0        1 
6.88%     -          0        1 
65.59%   -          0        1 
 
77.33%   -          0        1 
53.44%   -          0        1 
7.29%     -          0        1 









2.63636  1.308  0         7 
8.01894  4.711  0         19 
0.48121  0.61     0        4 
0.26397  0.164   0        0.8 
 
0.2197    0.109   0    0.5833 
0.25868  0.152   0    0.6129 
-0.03898 0.162  -0.53 0.731 
2.75        1.38     0        7 
8.57522  4.475  0         19 
0.45101  0.585  0          4 
0.25547  0.153  0          0.8 
 
0.22917  0.107  0         0.58333 
0.27662  0.144  0         0.6129 
-0.04745 0.157  -0.53 0.35752 
2.878543  1.173  0       6 
9.813765  4.077  0       18 
0.350489  0.362  0       3 
0.229093  0.123  0       0.75 
 
0.239879  0.098  0       0.5 
0.316573  0.132  0       0.5806 
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Table 5.  Simultaneous (SUR) Estimation of Value and MAC "Score" 
for All SDC-Matched Deals 
 
 [1] [2] 
Dependent Variable ln(Deal Value)     MEPerc  ln(Deal Value)     MEPerc 
Pre-Announcement VIX (10 day ave.)
Pre-Ann. Mkt. Risk. Prem. (10 day ave.)
Target Industry β
(Target Ind. Β) x (Mkt. Risk. Prem.)
(Pre-Ann. VIX) x (Mkt. Risk. Prem.)
Percentage Sought by Acquirer
Risk Free Rate
Acquirer is Strategic Buyer
Target Industry: Energy
Target Industry: Finance
Target Industry: High Tech
Number of Bidders (Inc. Acquirer)
ln(Acquirer's Accounting Value)
Acquirer Private and Target Public
Acquirer Public and Target Private
Both Acquirer and Target are Private
Constant
-0.038932             0.005324
[0.020076]       [0.002166]*
-0.712834           0.078647
[1.396309]       [0.150648]
-0.233522          -0.036485
[0.179521]       [0.019368] 
0.107718            -0.021346 
[0.530192] [0.057202]
0.030204                -0.0021 
[0.054890]         [0.005922]
0.010666           -0.000505
[0.003643]**   [0.000393]
14.829565            3.912929
[18.883097]     [2.037296]
-0.730625            0.032398

















6.720385          0.148239
[0.749347]**     [0.080847]
-0.036951           0.005399 
[0.019964]       [0.002163]* 
-0.60955           0.090377 
[1.389936]        [0.150610] 
-0.213236          -0.013303 
[0.244524]        [0.026496] 
0.258521          -0.027112 
[0.531089]        [0.057548] 
0.016676          -0.002202 
[0.054828]        [0.005941] 
0.01043          -0.000472 
[0.003626]**    [0.000393] 
16.830725           3.806878 
[18.794380]     [2.036518] 
-0.722676           0.028864 
[0.209756]**   [0.022729] 
0.189304           0.028805 
[0.22211]         [0.024078] 
-0.365233           0.030012 
[0.228603]        [0.024771] 
-0.196744          -0.006728 











6.698525          0.113333 
[0.776723]       [0.084164] 
Observations 420   420 420  420 
R2 0.0829               0.0316 0.0956              0.0367 
χ2 37.98**                 13.72 44.4**                16.01 
 
*significant at 5%; **significant at 1% 
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Table 5.  Simultaneous (SUR) Estimation of Value and MAC "Score" 
for All SDC-Matched Deals (continued) 
 
[3] [4] [5] 
ln(Deal Value)           MEPerc 
  
ln(Deal Value)           MEPerc 
  
ln(Deal Value)           MEPerc 
  
-0.036307                   0.005369 
[0.019781]       [0.002165]* 
-0.800415                   0.092467 
[1.377800]         [0.150807] 
-0.217246                  -0.012762 
[0.242637]         [0.026558] 
0.258261                  -0.026099 
[0.526736]         [0.057654] 
0.025571                   -0.002335 
[0.054428]         [0.005957] 
0.010421                   -0.000469 
[0.003591]*    *[0.000393] 
19.368907            3.806773 
[18.629090]      [2.039046] 
-0.757902                    0.028685 
[0.208322]*    *[0.022802] 
0.184312                   0.028465 
[0.220290]          [0.024112] 
-0.390937                   0.029838 
[0.226684]        [0.024812] 
-0.18922                  -0.007359 
[0.209717]        [0.022955] 
-0.281363           -0.011182 
[0.424848]        [0.046502] 
0.521098                  -0.004119 
[0.182135]*    *[0.019936] 
4.715305                    0.14275 
[1.189852]*             *[0.120235] 
-0.020687                0.004383
[0.018646]           [0.002139]*
-0.334127                   0.065382
[1.291218]            [0.148154]
-0.459923                    0.00002
[0.230119]*          [0.026404]
-0.043928                   -0.009697
[0.404962]            [0.056792]
0.021787                -0.002059
[0.050958]            [0.005847]
0.014952                  -0.000748
[0.003416]**        [0.000392]
18.262247                     3.91237
[17.446902]          [2.001856]
-0.689116                    0.016891
[0.217720]**        [0.024981]
0.373106                    0.016392
[0.208001]            [0.023866]
-0.684654                    0.046565
[0.215730]**      [0.0274753]
-0.143765                   -0.010774
[0.196623]            [0.022560]
-0.617751                0.014242
[0.406146]            [0.046601]
0.477592                    -0.0003
[0.171307]**        [0.019656]
1.040902                   -0.061267
[0.135204]**    [0.015513]**
-0.002985                    0.012985
[0.159545]            [0.018306]
4.186715                   0.164433
[1.122193]**             [0.128760]
-0.020044              0.004593 
[0.018660]    [0.002133]* 
-0.363195                    0.055912 
[1.291222]           [0.147580] 
-0.46415                      -0.001375 
[0.230077]*  [0.026297] 
-0.004025      0.003303 
[0.498174] [0.056939] 
0.021265                   -0.002229 
[0.050935]         [0.005822] 
0.015028                    -0.000723 
[0.003416]** [0.000390] 
18.54554                    4.004662 
[17.442346] [1.993573]* 
-0.662451                    0.025578 
[0.221121]**  [0.025273] 
0.372247                    0.016112 
[0.207891]               [0.023761] 
-0.683059                    0.047085 
[0.215625]**  [0.024645] 
-0.139151                    -0.009271 
[0.196633]             [0.022474] 
-0.670895                   -0.003071 
[0.413411]                [0.047251] 
0.483009                     0.001465 
[0.171399]**   [0.019590] 
0.987442                   -0.078682 
[0.156422]** [0.017878]** 
-0.101531                   -0.019119 
[0.215687]              [0.024652] 
-0.197816                 -0.064442 
[0.291545]               [0.033322] 
4.29634      0.200145 
[1.133155]**              [0.129514] 
420             420 420             420 420                           420 
0.1139                        0.0369 0.2235        0.0726 0.2243        0.0808 
53.96**          16.11 120.86**                      32.87** 121.45**                         36.9** 
  
*significant at 5%; **significant at 1% 
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Table 6.  Simultaneous (SUR) Estimation of Value of and MAC Score 
for Public Target Deals 
 
 [1] [2] 
Dependent Variable ln(Deal Value)   MEPerc   ln(Deal Value)   MEPerc  
Pre-Announcement VIX (10 day average)
Pre-Ann. Mkt. Risk. Prem. (10 day average)
Target Industry β (3-dig. SIC)
(Target Ind. Β) x (Mkt. Risk. Prem.)
(Pre-Ann. VIX) x (Mkt. Risk. Prem.)
Percentage Sought by Acquirer
Risk Free Rate
ln(Target's Pre-Ann. Equity Value)
Delaware Incorp. Target
Acquirer is Strategic Buyer
Target Macro Industry: Energy
Target Macro Industry: Finance




ln(Acquirer's Total Accounting Value)
ln(Target's Net Sales)
Target's Earning Per Share
Acquirer's Earnings Per Share
Target's Return on Equity (1 month)
Constant
-0.007348               0.00639
[0.007392]      [0.002399]**
-0.0393661 0.040833
[0.490173]          [0.159108]
-0.297843              0.015937
[0.091097]** [0.029570]
-0.142362            -0.017327
[0.195622]          [0.063498]
0.025826               0.00161
[0.019499]          [0.006329]
0.025749            -0.000431
[0.001054]* *[0.000342]
-8.158361             2.416646
[7.053910]  [2.289666]
0.999614              -0.003621
[0.016998]** [0.005517]
-0.050902             -0.002815
[0.052134]          [0.016922]
-0.040453            -0.014473
[0.071836]           [0.023318]
0.016795          0.049109
[0.108650]      [0.035267]
-0.304764         0.061099
[0.080517]**    [0.026135]*
-0.072042             0.012639

















-1.707442                0.09875
[0.314916]          [0.102220]
-0.004306           0.006576 
[0.007263]     [0.002416]** 
-0.490611          -0.046777 
[0.478858]        [0.159251] 
-0.290573           0.016383 
[0.088863]** [0.029552] 
-0.07294           -0.013071 
[0.191855]      [0.063804] 
0.026997           0.001682 
[0.019018]       [0.006325] 
0.025848          -0.000425 
[0.001028]** [0.000342] 
-6.313468            2.529747 
[6.900195]      [2.294749] 
1.001516           -0.003504 
[0.016586]**     [0.005516] 
-0.053055          -0.002947 
[0.050844]        [0.016909] 
0.11133          -0.005168 
[0.083032]        [0.027613] 
0.030677           0.049961 
[0.106033]        [0.035263] 
-0.292954           0.061824 
[0.078595]** [0.026138]* 
-0.050143           0.013981 
[0.072869]       [0.024233] 
















-1.820326           0.091829 
[0.30887]**       [0.102724] 
Observations 225      225 225   225 
R2 0.9511                 0.1013 0.9535               0.1029 
χ2 4374.24**                 25.37* 4611.26**               25.81* 
 
*significant at 5%; **significant at 1% 
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Table 6.  Simultaneous (SUR) Estimation of Value of and MAC Score 
for Public Target Deals (continued) 
 
[3] [4] [5] 
ln(Deal Value)             MEPerc  ln(Deal Value)             MEPerc  ln(Deal Value)             MEPerc  
-0.005489                   0.006361 
[0.006368] [0.002366]** 
-0.463931                    0.018304 
[0.418975]  [0.155671] 
-0.16698                   0.009415 
[0.078263]* [0.029079] 
-0.086653                   -0.025651 
[0.166490]  [0.061860] 
0.026902                  -0.000839 
[0.016763]            [0.006228] 
0.027077                  -0.000375 
[0.000947]** [0.000352] 
-7.64246                    2.754175 
[6.023683]            [2.238115] 
0.947616                   -0.004515 
[0.027555]** [0.010238] 
-0.068253                  -0.009206 
[0.044322]              [0.016468] 
0.149037                   0.011797 
[0.074120]* [0.027539] 
0.01736    0.052108 
[0.091934]              [0.034158] 
-0.487029                   0.039653 
[0.077230]** [0.028695] 
-0.016672                   0.030549 
[0.065743]              [0.024427] 
0.154882                   0.009567 
[0.054199]** [0.020138] 
-0.095702                    -0.04432 
[0.068828]            [0.025573] 
0.22436      0.035261 
[0.054590]** [0.020283] 
0.063924                   0.000287 
[0.062822]          [0.023342] 








-2.736197                   0.159925 
[0.384013]**             [0.142681] 
-0.004664                     0.00572
[0.006733]    [0.002449]*
-0.544263              0.017728
[0.431034]  [0.156760]
-0.168035                  -0.003086
[0.081117]* [0.029501]
-0.048036                  -0.017747
[0.171838]            [0.062495]
0.028171         -0.001349
[0.017301]            [0.006292]
0.026888                  -0.000576
[0.000988]** [0.000359]
-7.233766                   2.930707
[6.306542]           [2.293593]
0.93668   -0.012107
[0.030026]** [0.010920]
-0.074721                  -0.012742
[0.046524]          [0.016920]
0.120491                  -0.000449
[0.078710]           [0.028626]
0.000829                   0.059705
[0.096712]  [0.035173]
-0.498672              0.037092
[0.080079]** [0.029124]
-0.016755                    0.045817
[0.069446]          [0.025256]
0.153284                   0.014613
[0.055927]** [0.020340]
-0.0659    -0.036525
[0.072927]       [0.026522]
0.206366                    0.030957
[0.057709]** [0.020988]
0.077578                   0.007966
[0.069061]        [0.025116]
-1.00E-05      5.00E-06
[0.000004]* [0.000001]**
-0.000885                     0.00291
[0.0007437] [0.002705]
-0.000011                    0.000002
[0.000122]  [0.000044]
-0.013482                    -0.005757
[0.009207]  [0.003348]
-2.797672                   0.205419
[0.427408]**             [0.155442]
0.00937    0.005489 
[0.015953]  [0.002441]* 
-0.382318             0.013824 
[1.024864]           [0.156791] 
0.026677                  -0.005648 
[0.192407]  [0.029436] 
0.340864                   -0.026158 
[0.402976]  [0.061650] 
0.012583                  -0.000829 
[0.040733]  [0.006232] 
0.02287   -0.000539 
[0.002317]** [0.000354] 




-0.090004            -0.013102 
[0.110227]                [0.016863] 
-0.178862        0.003611 
[0.185757]          [0.028418] 
0.173346                   0.054545 
[0.223447]               [0.034184] 
-1.273127                   0.047239 
[0.181078]** [0.027703] 
0.014103                     0.045613 
[0.165166]  [0.025268] 
0.252747                     0.01345 
[0.132826]  [0.020321] 
1.403111                  -0.055563 
[0.132443]** [0.020262]** 
-0.572056                   0.041190 
[0.123695]** [0.018924]* 
0.325644                     0.004678 
[0.163196]* [0.024967] 
-2.00E-05                     5.00E-06 
[0.000010]* [0.000001]** 
0.039346                     0.002403 
[0.017425]* [0.002666] 
-0.000173                   0.000005 
[0.000290]  [0.000044] 
-0.080347                   -0.004906 
[0.021304]** [0.003259] 
-2.87495                    0.209113 
[1.015657]**              [0.155383] 
220           220 208              208 209           209 
0.9607          0.1783 0.9599       0.1971 0.7721       0.1919 
5383.99**                   47.22** 4982.56**                    51.05** 708.22**                    49.64** 
 
*significant at 5%; **significant at 1%  
